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State Dept. review completed

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S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-19/1

7 August 1951

DATA ON EUROPEAN INDUSTRY

On 3 May 1951 the IAC approved the proposal in IAC-D-19 to take steps to preserve data on European industry. The attached paper reports the action which has been taken in this matter.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-19/1

7 August 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-19/1
7 August 1951

DATA ON EUROPEAN INDUSTRY

25X1 1. The survey authorized by the IAC on 3 May 1951 was carried out by [redacted] of the Industrial Register between 8 May and 19 June, 1951.



25X1 3. Findings of the Survey: The following are the outstanding items:


a. Unique industrial and biographic data exist in very great quantity in many different stations under jurisdiction of the IAC agencies and the ECA. These should be carefully screened by competent specialists, and those of greatest importance should be microfilmed for IAC use in Washington.

b. Unclassified publications of great importance to economic research are to be found in many stations, though not available in Washington. They include such items as manufacturers' catalogs, trade directories, and local publications. Many are readily procurable through open channels overseas. They should be carefully screened, and direct procurement of the important items should be undertaken.

c. U.S. officials overseas feel even more keenly than those in Washington the need for a coordinated effort to bring together, safeguard, and analyze the industrial and biographic data in their custody.

25X1 4. CIA has equipped and staffed a Microfilm Team for this purpose under the leadership of [redacted] [redacted] will depart for Europe on or about 13 August 1951, to be followed in a week or ten days by the members of the team.

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7 August 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-67
18 February 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the report (Tab A) of the scientific panel convened as a result of the action taken by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 4 December (IAC-M-90, paragraph 3A) on this subject. Attached to the report are a summary of evidence presented (Tab B) and a list of the personnel participating (Tab C).

2. It is proposed to transmit copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Federal Civil Defense Administration; and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board for their information and such action as they may feel necessary.

3. The results of the panel's studies have moved CIA to conclude that no National Security Council Intelligence Directive on this subject is warranted.

4. Please inform the undersigned by 25 February 1953 if you do not concur in the action and conclusions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3, above.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-67
18 February 1953

S E C R E T

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TAB A

REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL
ON
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

1. Pursuant to the request of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, the undersigned Panel of Scientific Consultants has met to evaluate any possible threat to national security posed by Unidentified Flying Objects ("Flying Saucers"), and to make recommendations thereon. The Panel has received the evidence as presented by cognizant intelligence agencies, primarily the Air Technical Intelligence Center, and has reviewed a selection of the best documented incidents.

2. As a result of its considerations, the Panel concludes:

a. That the evidence presented on Unidentified Flying Objects shows no indication that these phenomena constitute a direct physical threat to national security.

We firmly believe that there is no residuum of cases which indicates phenomena which are attributable to foreign artifacts capable of hostile acts, and that there is no evidence that the phenomena indicate a need for the revision of current scientific concepts.

3. The Panel further concludes:

a. That the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena does, in these parlous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic.

We cite as examples the clogging of channels of communication by irrelevant reports, the danger of being led by continued false alarms to ignore real

S E C R E T

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indications of hostile action, and the cultivation of a morbid national psychology in which skillful hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and harmful distrust of duly constituted authority.

4. In order most effectively to strengthen the national facilities for the timely recognition and the appropriate handling of true indications of hostile action, and to minimize the concomitant dangers alluded to above, the Panel recommends:

a. That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Unidentified Flying Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired;

b. That the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training, and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action.

We suggest that these aims may be achieved by an integrated program designed to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence of inimical forces behind the phenomena, to train personnel to recognize and reject false indications quickly and effectively, and to strengthen regular channels for the evaluation of and prompt reaction to true indications of hostile measures.

/s/ H. P. Robertson, Chairman
California Institute of Technology

/s/ Luis W. Alvarez
University of California

/s/ Lloyd V. Berkner
Associated Universities, Inc.

/s/ S. A. Goudsmit
Brookhaven National Laboratories

/s/ Thornton Page
Johns Hopkins University

S E C R E T
Security Information

TAB B

**SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS**

14 - 17 January 1953

EVIDENCE PRESENTED

1. Seventy-five case histories of sightings 1951 - 1952 (selected by ATIC as those best documented).
2. ATIC Status and Progress Reports of Project GRUDGE and Project BLUE BOOK (code names for ATIC study of subject).
3. Progress Reports of Project STORK (code name for Battelle Memorial Institute contract work supporting ATIC).
4. Summary Report of Sightings at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.
5. Report of USAF Research Center, Cambridge, Mass., Investigation of "Green Fireball" Phenomena (Project TWINKLE).
6. Outline of Investigation of U.F.O.'s Proposed by Kirtland Air Force Base (Project POUNCE).
7. Motion Picture Films of sightings at Tremonton, Utah, 2 July 1952 and Great Falls, Montana, August 1950.
8. Summary Report of 89 selected cases of sightings of various categories (Formations, Blinking Lights, Hovering, etc.).
9. Draft of manual: "How to Make a FLYOVERPT", prepared at ATIC.
10. Chart Showing Plot of Geographic Location of Unexplained Sightings in the United States during 1952.
11. Chart Showing Balloon Launching Sites in the United States.
12. Charts Showing Selected Actual Balloon Flight Paths and Relation to Reported Sightings.
13. Charts Showing Frequency of Reports of Sightings, 1948 - 1952.
14. Charts Showing Categories of Explanations of Sightings.
15. Kodachrome Transparencies of Polyethylene Film Balloons in Bright Sunlight Showing High Reflectivity.

S E C R E T

TAB B

16. Motion picture of seagulls in bright sunlight showing high reflectivity.
17. Intelligence Reports Relating to U.S.S.R. Interest in U. S. Sightings.
18. Samples of Official USAF Reporting Forms and Copies of Pertinent Air Force, Army and Navy Orders Relating to Subject.
19. Sample Polyethylene "Pillow" Balloon (54 inches square).
20. "Variations in Radar Coverage", JANP 101 (Manual illustrating unusual operating characteristics of Service radar).
21. Miscellaneous official letters and foreign intelligence reports dealing with subject.
22. Copies of popular published works dealing with subject (articles in periodicals, newspaper clippings and books).

TAB C

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

14 - 17 January 1953

<u>MEMBERS</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>FIELD OF COMPETENCY</u>
Dr. H. P. Robertson (Chairman)	California Institute of Technology	Physics, weapons systems
Dr. Luis W. Alvarez	University of California	Physics, radar
Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner	Associated Universities, Inc.	Geophysics
Dr. Samuel Goudsmit	Brookhaven National Laboratories	Atomic structure, statistical problems
Dr. Thornton Page	Office of Research Operations, Johns Hopkins University	Astronomy, Astrophysics

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

Dr. J. Allen Hynek	Ohio State University	Astronomy
Mr. Frederick C. Durant	Arthur D. Little, Inc.	Rockets, guided missiles

INTERVIEWEES

Brig. Gen. William M. Garland	Commanding General, ATIC	Scientific and technical intelligence
Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell	Assistant Director, O/SI, CIA	Scientific and technical intelligence
Mr. Ralph L. Clark	Deputy Assistant Director, O/SI, CIA	Scientific and technical intelligence

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Security Information

TAB C

<u>INTERVIEWEES (con't)</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>FIELD OF COMPETENCY</u>
Mr. Philip G. Strong	Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI, CIA	Scientific and technical intelli- gence
Mr. Stephan T. Peasony	Acting Chief, Special Study Group, D/I USAF	Scientific and technical intelli- gence
Capt. Edward J. Ruppelt, USAF	Chief, Aerial Phenomena Branch, ATIC, USAF	Scientific and technical intelli- gence
Mr. J. Dewey Fournet, Jr.	The Ethyl Corporation	Aero Eng.
Lt. R. S. Neasham, USN	USN Photo Interpreta- tion Laboratory, Annapolis	Photo interpretation
Mr. Harry Wao	USN Photo Interpreta- tion Laboratory, Annapolis	Photo interpretation

TAB

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Survey of U.S. Information Agency's Intelligence Needs

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, on request of the Director of the U. S. Information Agency, and with the full support of the Department of State, has agreed to appoint an officer to conduct a survey of the U. S. Information Agency's essential intelligence needs. It is recognized that the U. S. Information Agency, in view of its recently acquired independent status, has a need for intelligence in order to fulfill its overseas information mission. Likewise, the U. S. Information Agency can probably provide resources useful to the Intelligence community.

2. There is attached at Tab A the Terms of Reference for this survey, which will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination.

3. It will be of undoubted assistance to the successful conclusion of this survey to have the advice of the IAC members and such information as they may have which bears on this question. Moreover, many IAC agencies have related needs for intelligence in support of propaganda and psychological warfare and an interest in the effects of any proposed arrangements on the respective agencies. Hence it would be appreciated if each IAC member would notify the undersigned as to a representative with whom Mr. Bissell's designee may work.

Secretary

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IAC-D-82
23 April 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets

1. Copy of subject report is attached. It was transmitted by the DCI to the Director, USIA, on 23 July, and accepted by the latter on 30 July 1954.

2. The IAC will note that three recommendations require IAC action. One of these (Part 1, paragraph 4c, page 4, and Tab A, paragraph A) is that the IAC approve a proposed distribution of NIE's and NIS to USIA. IAC action on the recommendation respecting NIS is being sought through IAC-D-45/55, to be circulated 6 August. IAC action on the recommendation respecting NIE's is being sought through IAC-D-82/2, to be circulated 6 August.

3. The other two recommendations requiring IAC action (Part 1, paragraph 4b, page 4, and Part 2, paragraph 4, page 5) are that the IAC approve the statement of "Types of Intelligence and Intelligence Information Required to Meet USIA's Essential Needs" (Part 1, paragraph 3c, pp. 1-3) as (a) the basis for providing intelligence and intelligence information needed by USIA and (b) as a basis for providing intelligence support to meet related needs of other agencies. The IAC will be asked to approve these two recommendations at an early meeting.


Secretary

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IAC-D-82/1
5 August 1954

REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND ASSETS
OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

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I. WHAT THE SURVEY TEAM CONCLUDES AND RECOMMENDS

(The conclusions and recommendations in the four parts which follow are based directly on the Terms of Reference, Tab E, which are quoted in their entirety herein.)

Part 1 Intelligence Needs

IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

1. Problem: To identify the types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet the U.S. Information Agency's essential needs.
2. Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included the question: "What are the U.S. Information Agency's essential intelligence needs to support its policy, programs, field and media operations, evaluation and training?" Each of these six major functional areas of USIA will need, in varying degrees, intelligence of the types listed below. In the case of USIA's evaluation of its program, it has been found by the Survey to be especially necessary to distinguish between the function of making evaluation judgments and the function of providing intelligence essential to such judgments.

3. Conclusions:

- a. The types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet USIA's essential needs have been identified as set forth in paragraph c below.

(These types deal solely with foreign intelligence or intelligence information and do not deal with USIA's needs for "Americana," i.e., domestic information on the U.S.)

- b. The required intelligence is not now adequate in character, and particularly in quantity, to meet the needs.
- c. USIA has essential needs for the following types of intelligence and intelligence information:
 - 1) Selected segments of societies: selected classes, groups, organizations (public and private), and their leadership, present and potential.

a) Size, composition, ideologies and attitudes, predispositions, and reactions to: (1) the United States, the USSR and other countries of greatest significance and

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Part I

Intelligence Needs

Conclusions (continued)

their basic policies, (2) critical foreign and internal problems.

b) The patterns of influence among groups, organizations, and leaders (including the government); specifically, who is influential, on whom, how, and how much.

2) Media Research and Analysis:

a) Communications habits and types of media in the country (press, publications, radio, motion pictures, TV).

b) Organizational aspects of each medium, including location, key personnel, finance, distribution and exhibition outlets, and a description of the facilities of the media.

c) The political orientation of the media.

d) The content of the communications output by the media.

e) Location, size and type of audience receiving the output of the media.

f) The reactions of the audience to the media, and why.

3) Foreign Propaganda, both friendly and unfriendly, including exchange of persons or cultural exchange.

a) Facilities and personnel.

b) Program content and plans.

c) Estimates of probable courses of foreign propaganda.

d) Analyses of foreign propaganda vulnerabilities.

4) Impact of factors affecting public opinion and attitudes and the net impact of such factors on the people of a country. Such factors would include historical attitudes of a people, and the influence of current domestic and foreign official and unofficial activities.

5) Descriptive Detail, that is, unclassified or declassified intelligence information to supplement the content of USIA media with items of local interest in order to make the output appear more interesting and more authoritative, particularly in denied areas.

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Intelligence Needs

Conclusions (continued)

6) International Communism:

- a) International organizations, personalities, programs, fiscal support, methods and success or failure of operations.
- b) Local applications, including counterespionage information, with emphasis on communications facilities.

d. It is recognized that intelligence and intelligence information pertinent to the needs described above can usefully be provided USIA in the following three basic forms of intelligence, which are normally used for production for other purposes:

- 1) Intelligence Estimates, including National Intelligence Estimates (intelligence covering the broad aspects of national policy and national security) and estimates of probable developments, capabilities and intentions regarding specific countries or areas.
- 2) Basic Intelligence, including National Intelligence Surveys, that is, factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less permanent or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.
- 3) Current Intelligence, that is, spot information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs, which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.
- 4) Intelligence Reports on Specialized Subjects.

- e. USIA needs certain intelligence publications currently produced by the IAC agencies. A list of such publications, with recommended distribution, is attached at Tab A.
- f. No elements of USIA, especially Field and Media operations, should be sent masses of intelligence. Rather, annotated bibliographies of available finished intelligence (e.g., Annex C to Tab I, Annex B to Tab J) should be made available to the media and the field for their review and selection of those items which they wish to have made available for their review and possible retention.

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Part 1 **Intelligence Needs**

4. Recommendations

- a. That the Director of USIA approve the statement of "Types of Intelligence and Intelligence Information Required to Meet USIA's Essential Needs" (Conclusion 3c, pp. 1-3) as the basis for requesting intelligence and intelligence information for USIA.
- b. That the IAC agencies approve Conclusion 3c as the basis for providing intelligence and intelligence information needed by USIA. (Action: DCI, with appropriate IAC members.)
- c. That the IAC approve the recommended distribution of National Intelligence (Tab A). (Action: DCI and the IAC.)
- d. That CIA and State approve the recommended distribution of certain of their intelligence publications (Tab A). (Action: DCI, State/Special Assistant, Intelligence.)
- e. That USIA arrange directly with the military intelligence agencies for receipt of certain of their intelligence publications.

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Part 2 Related Needs of Other Agencies

RELATED NEEDS OF OTHER AGENCIES

1. Problem: To determine the extent to which the types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet the essential needs of USIA are related to the essential needs of other US programs.
2. Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included the original specific question: "Is the intelligence and intelligence information required to support a covert psychological warfare program and the US Information Agency program so similar that it could be provided most efficiently by a single organization? If so, where should that organization be?" It has become clear in the course of the Survey that this question is too limited and should be inclusive, as is the statement of the problem above, of other related US programs. (The relationship of foreign propaganda analysis to other intelligence support is being studied separately from this survey.)
3. Conclusions:
 - a. The types of intelligence and intelligence information identified as required to meet the essential needs of USIA are substantially those required to meet the needs of CIA/DDP/ ☐ (except for detailed "operational intelligence" and "CE information," which should be provided by DDP), the Public Affairs Staff of the State Department, and to a lesser extent (because of requirements bearing upon enemy military personnel, which should be met by the military intelligence agencies) the "psywar" programs of the Armed Services.
 - b. Therefore, to the extent that these types of intelligence and intelligence information meet the needs of agencies with related missions, these agencies should be served in the main by a single organization (See Part 3). To assure the provision of intelligence and to supplement the service provided by the central organization, USIA should have its own intelligence unit. That unit is recommended below, see Part 3 and Tab B.
4. Recommendations:

That the appropriate IAC members approve conclusions 3a and b above as a basis for providing intelligence support to meet the related needs of other agencies. (Action DCI with appropriate IAC members.)

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Part 3 Organizational Arrangements

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Problem: To recommend the organizational arrangements, and sources and magnitude of funds, required to provide the US Information Agency with such essential intelligence and intelligence information as can be obtained and which can be made available.
2. Discussion: Consideration of this problem has included the following questions:
 - a. Are the present mechanisms and the interdepartmental arrangements adequately responsive to the U.S. Information Agency's essential needs?
 - b. What present facilities and resources in the Government not now utilized by or made available to the U.S. Information Agency could be more effectively utilized by the U.S. Information Agency in order to satisfy its intelligence needs?
 - c. If the U.S. Information Agency needs an intelligence staff, what should be the order of magnitude of such a staff?
 - d. Should the U.S. Information Agency be a member of the IAC?
 - e. Are revisions required in NSC Intelligence Directives?
 - f. What security arrangements are required to meet solutions to the above problems, and in particular, how can the needs of the U.S. Information Agency for declassification of pertinent intelligence best be achieved?
3. Conclusions
 - a. The intelligence required for USIA activities does not differ in kind from the intelligence required to support the political, economic, and military activities of the government. USIA does, however, require the intelligence identified in Part 1, paragraph 3 above, with an emphasis, a detail, and a form not normally required in intelligence produced for other purposes.

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Part 3

Organizational Arrangements

b. In the main, provision of the types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet the essential needs of USIA has been the primary responsibility of the Department of State, which has utilized its own resources and those resources supported or contributed by other agencies, as established in NSCID-3. Production by State has, of course, been supplemented by production by other intelligence units maintained by agencies with related needs.

c. The total available intelligence of the types required by USIA and similar consumers has been inadequate in character, and particularly in quantity, to meet the needs of these consumers. This inadequacy has been most marked with respect to basic intelligence and special reports based thereon (as distinguished from intelligence estimates and current intelligence.) Therefore the production of basic intelligence in the fields set forth in Part I 3.c above should be increased, along with that of special reports based substantially thereon. The USIA should also be given wider access to intelligence estimates and to current intelligence as recommended in Part I 4.d above to meet its needs for these forms of intelligence.

d. On the basis of the allocation of responsibilities within the Intelligence Community presently set forth in NSCID-3, the Department of State should continue to provide the major part of the intelligence required by the USIA, and by other consumers with similar needs. If it is to discharge this function, its production of intelligence should be increased mainly by an expansion of the NIS both topically and in depth of detail, particularly to include increased and more adequate intelligence on "International Communism."

e. To meet its remaining needs, the USIA should have an intelligence organization designed to ensure that full use is made of the resources of the intelligence community and to be responsive to those USIA needs which cannot be met by the community. The recommended functions and T/O for a USIA intelligence organization are set forth at Tab B and Annex A thereto. "Intelligence" means foreign intelligence in this survey. Nevertheless, USIA may find it desirable to include in the proposed USIA intelligence organization the function of providing "Americana," i. e., domestic information on the U. S.

f. In drawing a definite line between the State Department's function of providing basic intelligence and special reports and that of the USIA's

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Part 3

Organizational
Arrangements

intelligence organization, the basic principle should be to ensure the fullest use of the Department of State's analytical staff and to avoid any duplication by the new USIA organization. Accordingly, the State Department should continue to produce such special reports and analyses required by USIA and similar consumers as can efficiently be turned out by the Department's analytical staff without competing with its basic responsibilities or its ability to meet the State Department's own specialized needs. In general terms the analytical functions of the proposed USIA intelligence organization should be limited to: (a) the tailoring of basic intelligence to its special needs, and (b) the performance of analyses which by reason of some special circumstances cannot efficiently and conveniently be performed elsewhere in the intelligence community.

g. The Survey has found it especially necessary to distinguish between the function of making evaluation judgments and that of providing the intelligence essential to such judgments (see Part I, paragraph 2 above), and has concluded it would not be desirable to place the responsibility for making evaluation judgments on the USIA's programs within the USIA intelligence organization. That responsibility properly should be integrated with the executive functions of the Agency or discharged by a separate staff.

h. USIA operations in the field (USIS) require intelligence support; in addition to such support as can be provided from Washington, some local support can be provided. The needs for such support and the possibilities of meeting those needs locally vary greatly between posts and programs.

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j. USIA should not become a member of the IAC at this time because:

(1) It is not believed that the contribution which USIA could make to National Intelligence Estimates is one which would be sufficiently different from the contributions of the present IAC members.

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Part 3
Organizational
Arrangements

(2) The interagency arrangements recommended by this report can be effected without USIA membership on the IAC.

(3) Whenever matters within the purview of USIA are to be discussed by the IAC, the DCI can invite USIA participation, as provided in NSCID-1. (Similar USIA representation should be obtained by the IAC subcommittees on basic intelligence defectors, and foreign language publications.)

k. The question of IAC membership should be reexamined after a sufficient amount of time has passed for the implementation of this report.

l. No revisions in the NSCIDs are required to enable the intelligence needs of the USIA and similar consumers to be adequately met as proposed in this Survey, that is in a manner which reflects the present allocation of responsibilities as among the various agencies that make up the intelligence community.

m. To obtain the intelligence and intelligence information required to meet its essential needs, the USIA should make such adjustments as are necessary in its security standards for personnel and handling of information.

Recommendations:

a. That the Department of State, as the appropriate agency under NSCID-3, expand and redirect the resources of its intelligence organization so as to accomplish the additional production, principally under the NIS program, recommended above. This will require the use for these purposes of additional funds and personnel over and above those now available in the Department of State or elsewhere. Eventually the additional outlay required under the NIS program might amount to [] or possibly even more. Because of problems of recruitment and production planning, however, only [] to [] and 30 to 40 additional slots over and above those originally budgeted will be required for these purposes in the Fiscal Year 1955. Except insofar as these resources can be made available by the curtailment of other activities in the Department of State's intelligence organization or elsewhere, the necessary funds should be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency through the NIS program pending a reexamination of the method of financing that program.

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Part 3

Organizational
Arrangements

b. That USIA establish an intelligence organization, separate from the Department of State, with functions and organization as set forth in Tab B and Annex A to Tab B, and with funds provided by USIA's regular appropriations. Until a sufficient amount of time has passed for the implementation of this report the organization should have a T/O of an order of magnitude of 70 to 90 positions.

c. That the following organizations now under the administration of USIA be abolished: CPI, VOA Library & Research, Photo and IPS Libraries, and that part of IEV which has been engaged in the collection and production of intelligence. The slots and money thus freed will be enough to meet a T/O of the order of magnitude described above.

d. That USIA be invited to participate in pertinent activities of the IAC subcommittees on basic intelligence, defectors, and foreign language publications. (Action: DCI, with Chairmen of the NIS, IDC, and FLP subcommittees.)



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f. That USIA inform the intelligence agencies as to USIA's present security practices in order to assure safe handling of classified intelligence and information, and make such adjustments as may be necessary to insure the necessary freedom of exchange and discussion. (Action: Director, USIA, in consultation with each intelligence agency.)

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Part 4
USIA Assets

USIA ASSETS

1. **Problem:** To recommend measures to insure that such intelligence or intelligence information produced or collected by the U. S. Information Agency is made available to the IAC agencies.

2. **Discussion:** Consideration of this problem has included the questions: "Is there any important intelligence available uniquely to the U. S. Information Agency which is not known to the intelligence community? Is there likely to be any such under new arrangements?"

3. **Conclusions:**

a. USIS missions are in a position to add significantly to the collection of intelligence information for USIA and related consumers.

b. Requirements upon USIS missions for such collection should be carefully drawn, levied in moderation, and coordinated in Washington by USIA with the Department of State.

c. In the field USIS reporting should be coordinated with reporting by other sections of the Embassy.

d. USIA should screen and disseminate its intelligence and intelligence information to U. S. agencies concerned.

e. USIA may well develop information collecting techniques useful to related programs and to intelligence. Such information and techniques should be made available to U. S. agencies concerned.

4. **Recommendations:**

a. That USIS reporting be conducted under the direction of the USIA intelligence organization in coordination with the State Department.

b. That such reporting be coordinated in the field by the Chief of the U. S. Mission, as is his responsibility generally.

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II HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED

1. By an exchange of letters in April 1954 (Tabs C and D) the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the United States Information Agency agreed that the former should conduct a survey of USIA's intelligence needs and assets and submit recommendations on how those needs should be met and those assets used. The terms of reference for the Survey are at Tab E.
2. The DCI appointed, as Director of the Survey, Mr. Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination.
3. To accomplish his assignment, Mr. Bissell established his survey team which devoted the major part of its time to the conduct of the survey during the eight weeks which then ensued.
4. The IAC Agencies were invited to participate (Tab F, IAC-D-82). In addition, Mr. Bissell requested USIA, the Operations Coordinating Board, and DDP/CIA to designate an official in their respective areas on whom the Survey could call for assistance and advice, and who would be in a position to arrange for interviews and conferences with their officials who had an interest in the problems faced by the Survey.
5. The following are the officials who were thus appointed:

USIA	Mr. Henry Loomis
OCB	Dr. Horace S. Craig
DDP/CIA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 100%;"></div>
IAC/State:	Mr. Fisher Howe
Army:	Mr. Yaro J. Skalnik
Navy:	Lt. Comdr. A. Christopher
AF:	Major Thomas B. Johnson

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JIG: Captain P. C. Staley, USN

AEC: Dr. Charles Reichardt

FBI: Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz

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6. As may be observed from the records of interviews and conferences, Mr. Loomis, Mr. Howe, Mr. Craig and [REDACTED] were invited to attend as observers as many Survey meetings as possible, since the solutions to the problems would require primarily the understanding and cooperation of the most interested agencies represented by these officials. They were of course, free to ask questions and to enter into the discussions.

7. In conducting its investigation to determine the needs for intelligence on the part of USIA, the Survey Team initially sought to understand as fully as possible the functions of the various components of USIA, to discern what they considered were their needs, and to help them articulate needs previously only vaguely phrased.

8. The Survey Team interviewed or held conferences with over 100 individuals from all components of USIA/Washington, VOA/New York (where two days were spent), the Department of State (Public Affairs Staff, Political desks, Intelligence area), Operations Coordinating Board (staff), CIA/DDP, PAOs, USIS Missions in Europe (Ten days to cover London, Paris, Vienna, Munich) and in Latin America (Ten days to cover Rio, Trinidad, and Mexico City.) (See Tab G.)

9. The Survey Team reviewed examples of both raw and finished intelligence in this field, as well as documents bearing upon the organizational aspects of this problem. A selection of the latter is listed at Tab H.

10. In order to relate the statement of need to specific USIA operations, Thailand and India were selected as case studies. Memoranda explaining these studies, with their conclusions, are submitted separately (see Tabs I and J).

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Tab A

List of Intelligence Publications and Recommended Distribution

Note: Access to the intelligence publications listed below should be provided to each official, though this need not necessarily mean the distribution of a separate copy to each.

The dissemination recommended in this list is subject to USIA's meeting the originating agency's security standards for handling of classified material. It is also subject to whatever controls over dissemination and use of intelligence and information are imposed by the originating agency and, in the case of National Intelligence, the IAC.

A. National

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs and SNIES)

Dissemination:

Washington: Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director, Area and Deputy Area Directors, Chief and Area Chiefs of IOP, II, Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Media.

Field: Based upon area through the Department and Ambassador to the PAO and Deputy PAO. The standard letter from Mr. Armstrong to the Chiefs of Mission which transmits national estimates should be revised to include reference of the estimate to and solicitation of comment from the PAO.

National Intelligence Surveys (NISs)

Dissemination:

Washington: Should be readily available to all members of USIA except administrative employees.

Field: Should be readily available to PAO staff, according to area, except foreign nationals.

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B. CIA

OCI Daily (Secret)

Dissemination:

Washington
Only:

Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director
Area & Deputy Area Directors, Chief
and Area Chiefs of IOP, II, Chiefs and
Deputy Chiefs of Media.

OCI Weekly (Secret)

Dissemination:

Washington:

Same as OCI Daily

Field:

PAO staffs, except foreign nationals.

CIA Library Reports (Bibliographies of selected books,
pamphlets, or intelligence documents)

Dissemination:

Washington
Only:

II -- for use in levying requirements
based upon the statement of USIA's
essential intelligence needs and to
prepare appropriate annotated bibliog-
raphies for USIA.

Intelligence Publications Index

Dissemination:

Same as CIA Library Reports.

FDD Publications

Dissemination:

Washington:

Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director,
II, IOP, and the area and media staffs.

Field:

To PAO staffs.

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C. State Department

Daily Summary (Secret) (daily)
Current Foreign Relations (weekly)
Psychological Intelligence Digest (biweekly)
Soviet Affairs (monthly)
International Communism (monthly)

Dissemination:

Washington: Director, Deputy Director, SA/Director,
Area and Deputy Area Directors, IOP,
II, Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Media.

Field: To PAO staffs except foreign nationals.
These publications are already avail-
able to the missions.

D. Other Intelligence Publications Produced by the IAC and Agencies

Such other intelligence publications as are provided to USIA
against the statement of USIA's essential intelligence needs
should be disseminated according to needs.

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TAB B

FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED USIA INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

I. Major Functions

- A. Assure the provision to USIA of the intelligence or intelligence information required to support its planning, execution, and review of operations.
- B. Maintain liaison with the intelligence collection and production offices of the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies and other agencies of the Government, as necessary, to represent USIA's interests in intelligence collection and production. Acquire through established channels intelligence information reports, publications, and documents as required to support the operations of USIA. Analyze this material to ensure dissemination to appropriate desks for immediate application to USIA plans, programs and projects being developed.
- C. Coordinate within USIA and with PIRS/State and other agencies, USIA's interests in external research projects. Keep currently informed of, provide a central source of information on, and assess the capabilities of external research projects of current or potential interest to USIA. Arrange for contract research when any intelligence support requirement can best be satisfied outside the Government.
- D. Conduct original research and prepare evaluated reports in support of USIA programs when requirements cannot be satisfied by OIR/State, elsewhere within the Government, or by external research.
- E. Provide such library and reference facilities necessary for USIA operations as cannot be provided by utilization of existing facilities of other agencies.
- F. In carrying out the above, the USIA Intelligence Organization should consult directly with USIA components and keep advised of and arrange for the satisfaction of intelligence support requirements.

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II. Functions of Components

A. Intelligence Acquisition and Dissemination Division

1. Establishes and coordinates programs to make available to USIA intelligence produced and information collected by IAC and non-IAC agencies of the United States Government.
2. Accepts and coordinates specific and long-range requirements from elements of USIA and other agencies for intelligence support; satisfies these requirements by:
 - a. Identification, location, and procurement of existing intelligence;
 - b. Analysis and dissemination of incoming intelligence materials;
 - c. Requesting the production of new intelligence by IAC research, foreign and domestic field collection, or National Estimate preparation;
 - d. Levying requirements for collection on USIS missions and other agencies.
3. Maintains continuing liaison with IAC agencies' research and support activities in order to be advised of and coordinate with all intelligence programs of interest and possible benefit to USIA.
4. Serves as the control point for dissemination, use, and declassification requests for intelligence materials required to meet USIA's needs.

B. External Research Division

1. Develops, defines, and coordinates USIA requirements which are suitable for external research action; negotiates with requestors and contractor to relate requirements to the contractor's resources.
2. Monitors the research programs of quasi-governmental and private institutions, foundations, and individuals to

ensure that USIA requirements are included within the scope of proposed projects whenever feasible, and that research products of interest to USIA are made available, upon completion, to appropriate USIA elements.

3. Maintains continuing liaison with the OCB staff, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State; Department of Defense; CIA; and any other Government agency with external research activities of interest to USIA.

C. Research Division

1. Receives and analyzes specific requests from elements of USIA for intelligence support requiring original research or the collation of research data.
2. Consults directly with requesting offices to determine their specific needs; advises on intelligence support capabilities and on the progress of research.
3. Determines which phases of required research can be accomplished by other United States Government agencies, or by external contract; coordinates such research through the appropriate components of USIA.
4. Conducts original research and produces evaluated reports in accordance with intelligence support research requirements which cannot be answered by OIR/State, elsewhere within the Government or by external research.
5. Assists other branches of the division in locating unusual intelligence support materials (especially foreign language documents) pertaining to special areas or subjects.
6. Maintains awareness of developing situations on an area, world-wide, and functional basis in order to anticipate intelligence support needs of USIA.


D. Library Division

1. Provides such library and references facilities necessary for USIA operations as cannot be provided by utilization of existing library facilities of other agencies.

2. Maintains liaison with other existing libraries to assure that their services are made available to USIA whenever possible, thus avoiding duplication of existing available library services.

Organizational Chart for Proposed USIA Intelligence Organization

(II)



22 April 1954

Mr. Theodore C. Streibert
Director,
United States Information Agency
Washington 25, D.C

Dear Mr. Streibert:

As you know, there have been several recent informal discussions between USIA and CIA officials regarding USIA's essential intelligence needs. Your representatives have proposed that I appoint an officer to conduct a survey which would identify those needs and recommend measures to meet them.

In response to this request I have appointed Mr. Richard Bissell, my Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination, to direct such a survey. It is my understanding that the terms of reference attached are agreeable to the Department of State as well as to CIA. If they are also in accord with your thinking, then the survey can begin promptly.

You will note that these terms of reference include questions of mutual interest to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies. Consequently, I will inform the IAC of this survey and ask each member to designate an official who can work with Mr. Bissell, and with Mr. James O. Reber, whom Mr. Bissell has requested to carry the main burden of this task.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

ALLEN W. DULLES

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 23, 1954

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Dear Mr. Dulles:

Thank you for your letter of April 22 in which you agree that a survey of the essential intelligence needs of the U. S. Information Agency should be conducted under your auspices. I am pleased that you have appointed your Special Assistant, Mr. Richard Bissell, as director of the survey.

The terms of reference which were attached to your letter are entirely satisfactory to me. I believe that when the questions outlined in the survey have been answered we should be in a position to know clearly what is needed and how best to go about meeting those needs. I, too, am interested that any contribution which this Agency can make to the intelligence effort of the Government should be made. I recognize the interest of other Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies in this matter, and welcome their participation as you deem appropriate.

I have requested the officials of this Agency to assist Mr. Bissell in any possible way.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
Theodore C. Streibert
Director

Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

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Tab E

Terms of Reference for

U. S. Information Agency's Intelligence Needs

1. In view of the U. S. Information Agency's mission and functions, as stated in the U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended; in the President's Message to the Congress of 1 June 1953, and in NSC 165/1, 24 October 1953, the survey shall:

a. Identify the types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet the U. S. Information Agency's essential needs.

b. Recommend the organizational arrangements, and sources and magnitude of funds, required to provide the U. S. Information Agency with such essential intelligence and intelligence information as can be obtained and which can be made available.

c. Recommend measures to insure that such intelligence or intelligence information produced or collected by the U. S. Information Agency is made available to the IAC agencies.

In conducting the survey, the related needs of all intelligence agencies for similar intelligence and intelligence information should be taken into account, as well as the resources both in Washington and in the field.

2. Among specific problems to be included in the survey are:

1) What are the U. S. Information Agency's essential intelligence needs to support its policy, programs, field and media operations, evaluation and training?

2) Are the present mechanisms and interdepartmental arrangements adequately responsive to the U. S. Information Agency's essential needs?

3) What present facilities and resources in the Government not now utilized by or made available to the U. S. Information Agency could be more effectively utilized by

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the U. S. Information Agency in order to satisfy its intelligence needs?

4) Is there any important intelligence available uniquely to the U. S. Information Agency which is not known to the intelligence community? Is there likely to be any such under new arrangements?

5) Is the intelligence and intelligence information required to support a covert psychological warfare program and the U. S. Information Agency program so similar that it could be provided most efficiently by a single organization? If so, where should that organization be?

6) If the U. S. Information Agency needs an intelligence staff, what should be the order of magnitude of such a staff?

7) Should the U. S. Information Agency be a member of the IAC?

8) Are revisions required in NSC Intelligence Directives?

9) What security arrangements are required to meet solutions to the above problems, and in particular, how can the needs of the U. S. Information Agency for declassification of pertinent intelligence best be achieved?

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IAC-D-82
23 April 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Survey of U.S. Information Agency's Intelligence Needs

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, on request of the Director of the U. S. Information Agency, and with the full support of the Department of State, has agreed to appoint an officer to conduct a survey of the U. S. Information Agency's essential intelligence needs. It is recognized that the U. S. Information Agency, in view of its recently acquired independent status, has a need for intelligence in order to fulfill its overseas information mission. Likewise, the U. S. Information Agency can probably provide resources useful to the Intelligence community.

2. There is attached at Tab A the Terms of Reference for this survey, which will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination.

3. It will be of undoubted assistance to the successful conclusion of this survey to have the advice of the IAC members and such information as they may have which bears on this question. Moreover, many IAC agencies have related needs for intelligence in support of propaganda and psychological warfare and an interest in the effects of any proposed arrangements on the respective agencies. Hence it would be appreciated if each IAC member would notify the undersigned as to a representative with whom Mr. Bissell's designee may work.


Secretary

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USIA SURVEY
List of Persons Consulted

USIA

Theodore C. Streibert
Abbot Washburn
Henry Loomis

Director
Deputy Director
SA/Director

IOP

Andrew H. Berding
William S. Peterson
Ralph Hilton
Robert W. Ehrman
Leonard Ware
Robert C. Hickok
Robert Delaney
D. Elton Trueblood
Bernard Wiesman

Assistant Director
Far Eastern Division
Chief, American Republics Division
Chief Near East Division
Near East Division
Chief, European Division
Soviet Orbit Division
Religious Advisor
Labor Advisor

IRI

Antonio A. Micocci
Lewis M. Nixon
Louis T. Olom

Chief
Acting Chief, Research and Evaluation
Chief, Intelligence

IBS

Edward F. Lethen, Jr.
John M. Vebber
Leo Lowenthal
Robert A. Bauer
Alexander Barmine
John Armitage
Spencer M. King
Christopher Squire
Gerald F. Doohar
John Nalley
H. Roth Newpher
Vestel Lott
Barry Zorthian
Dorothy Crook
Robert Mayer
Joseph C. Walsh

Former Acting Assistant Director
Program Manager
Former Director, Evaluation Staff
Chief, European Division
Chief, Russian Branch
European Division
Chief, East Europe Branch
East Europe, Czechoslovak Service
Chief, Near East, South Asia and Africa Div.
Far East Division
Chief, Research and Library Branch
Chief, Central Program Services Division
Chief, News Branch
Chief, Talks and Features Branch
Talks and Features Branch
Chief, Security

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Tab G

IPS

Harlan Logan
John A. Hutchison
Herbert P. McGushin
Leo J. Pinkus
John E. Dineen

Chief
Deputy Chief
Chief Editorial Division
Chief General Service Branch
Chief, Special Materials Section

ICS

Franklin L. Burdette
Richard A. Humphrey
Franklin B. Steiner

Chief
Deputy Chief
Chief, Translation Branch

IMS

Andrew W. Smith, Jr.
Turner B. Shelton

Chief
Deputy Chief

IOS

Charles M. Noone

Chief

Area Directors

William Clark
Frank Oram

Ned E. Nordness
Charles K. Moffly
Saxton Bradford

Assistant Director for American Republics
Deputy Assistant Director American
Republics
Assistant Director for Europe
Deputy Assistant Director for Europe
Assistant Director for Far East

Interviewed in Washington--Private Personnel

Lloyd Free

Princeton Research Center

Interviewed in Washington--Field Personnel

Eugene J. Rachlis
Daniel E. Moore
Lawrence S. Morris

European Service Center
Chief Provincial Officer, Thailand
Chief Cultural Affairs Officer, Paris

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Field Personnel-Continued

Laurence P. Dalcher
William D. Killea
Stefan P. Munsing
William J. Handley
Emily E. Krueger


Chief Information Officer, Austria (Vienna)
PAO, Guadalajara
Director of Amerika Haus (Berlin)
Deputy PAO, New Delhi
Planning and Evaluation Officer, New Delhi

State

Fisher Howe
Allan Evans
Jesse M. MacKnight
Walter K. Schwinn
Sidney Buford
George A. Pope
Fred Shipman
Kenneth P. Landon
Evron Kirkpatrick

Deputy Special Assistant Intelligence
Director, OIR
Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary-
Public Affairs
Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary-
Public Affairs
Director, OLI
Acting Chief, IAD/OLI
Assistant Chief for Records/DC
Officer in Charge Thai and Malayan Affairs,
PSA
Deputy Director, OIR, for Psychological
Intelligence

CIA



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OCB

Dr. Horace Craig
Wallace Irwin
Neilson C. Debevoise
Charles Taquey

Army

Col. Edward S. Berry
Yaro J. Skalnik

JIC

Captain P. C. Staley

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Tab G

Navy

Lt. Comdr. A. Christopher

Air Force

Major Thomas B. Johnson

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Basic Documents Considered by the Survey Team*

1. U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended.
2. President's Message to the Congress of 1 June 1953, transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953.
3. NSC 165/1, 24 October 1953.
4. Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 30 June 1953.
5. 25X1
6.
7. Intelligence Support for Psychological Operations 21 June 1951. 25X1
8. Intelligence Requirements on the IIA April, May 1953. 25X1
9. Requests for CPI Services, 12 February 1954.
10. Biographic Sketches of Senior CPI Personnel, 6 January 1954.
11. (USIA) Staffing Pattern and Grades, 5 January 1954.
12. CIA Materials Desired on a Continuing Basis by USIA, 6 January 1954.
13. Criteria for Organization of USIS Field Posts, 16 February 1954.
14. (USIA) Operating Responsibilities and Relationships, 19 February 1954.
15. Current Program, CPI: A Survey of CPI Services in Support of IIA. 21 October 1952.
16. Schramm Committee Report: A Program of Research and Evaluation for IIA, 15 June 1953.
17. OIR Planning for a PW Country Handbook Project, 2 June 1953.

* The above list does not include substantive intelligence reports which were examined generally by the survey team and examined in detail during the case studies on Thailand and India (see Tabs I and J).

Case Study on Thailand

Purpose:

1. To examine in some detail the relation of intelligence to a USIA country program.

The Study Itself:

2. Phase 1: A briefing of the Thailand program was given by the AD/FE, Mr. Saxton Bradford, to representatives of USIA components (IOP, IRI, CPI, ICS, IMS, IPS), State Department personnel (PSA, P, OIR), and CIA (OCI, ONE, DDP, and the Survey Team).

Phase 2: The Survey Team submitted to the foregoing personnel a copy of the "Psychological Offensive for Thailand" (February 9, 1954) and the USIA-approved country plan for Thailand (which is attached hereto as Annex A). The Survey Team noted in its covering memorandum intelligence materials which it had examined and found relevant to such a program, including at least nine sections of the NIS on Thailand, and the available National Estimate (SE-45), and intelligence monographs on various subjects.

3. OIR and CPI submitted lists of intelligence products relating to Thailand. These are attached at Annex C. These studies have been arranged in keeping with the "Statement of Types of Intelligence Needed for USIA."

4. Phase 3: On the basis of the meeting, and subsequent to it, there was prepared a list of intelligence questions derived from an examination of the Thailand psychological offensive plan. Such questions, if answered, would (a) confirm or cast doubt upon the assumptions underlying the program and (b) meet operational requirements of the program itself. These questions were disseminated to the original list of people with the request that they amend, delete or add such questions as would make this list more pertinent to the "Plan." This list, as finally amended, is set forth at Annex B.

5. Because of the limited time available for the survey, it was not possible to request existing intelligence facilities of the Government to set about answering these questions for the survey. However, those participating are satisfied that these are the questions on Thailand which intelligence should answer. Collection requirements as necessary should be levied on the field.

Conclusions:

1. That the Department of State should proceed to answer these intelligence questions insofar as extensive basic, essential materials on Thailand already available will permit. When necessary to the answering of these questions, intelligence information requirements should be levied on the field. (It does not appear, at least in the case of Thailand, that the intelligence needs are sufficiently different from the regular mission of OIR/State to warrant the establishment of a USIA intelligence organization to produce finished intelligence to meet all of these needs.)
2. That these intelligence questions should have been formulated and answered prior to or at least simultaneous with the "Psychological Offensive."
3. That such intelligence questions as developed should be used as a pattern for guiding intelligence production on other countries, with adjustments required to allow for the differences between Thailand and such countries. For example, this has been done in the case of India (See Tab J, Annex A). Only in this way is it believed that intelligence can know with sufficient precision what it is that USIA planners, media and field people want and need, and set forth preparing an "Intelligence Annex" for USIA country plans.
4. That the USIS offices in Thailand should report to Washington any intelligence information derived from operating the "Psychological Offensive" in Thailand. (Such reporting should, of course, be coordinated at the post with other mission reportings.)

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Tab I

Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100030001-6 Annex A

PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE FOR THAILAND

I. Mission of USIS:

To strengthen the will and ability of the people of Thailand to (1) actively resist Communist infiltration, subversion and political pressures and (2) strongly support the nation's armed forces in case of armed aggression by external Communist forces.

II. Strategy:

A. This mission is to be accomplished in three ways - (1) through the immediate launching of a psychological offensive against Communism; (2) through the day-to-day factual reporting and objective interpretation of U.S. policy through press, radio and the distribution of official publications; and (3) by long-range cultural media including exchange of persons, libraries and reading rooms, a language institute, and other activities designed to promote understanding and appreciation of the U.S. --its people, culture and way of life.

Each of the three will be used to complement the other; i.e., longer-range cultural activities will be conducted in such a way as to further shorter-range psychological objectives to the greatest extent feasible. Conversely, no short range activities will be undertaken which are inconsistent with longer-range goals.

B. Every effort will be made to assist the Thai Government to develop a strong, efficient information organization capable of effective operations. USIS will work, to the greatest extent possible, with and through this organization and other indigenous agencies, leaders, outlets and normal channels of contact. (The Thai Government has no information agency at present, other than its Public Relations Office, the main purpose of which is to keep the present government in power).

C. At the outset, USIS will (1) work with the Thai Government Committee appointed and chaired by the Prime Minister on matters of policy and planning and (2) explore the possibility of working with the National Development Board on program materials and operations.

The National Development Board includes the Deputy of each Ministry and has a special information section with which USIS will work closely. NDB operates in the provinces through nine teams sent out from Bangkok, one to each of the nine administrative areas of the country for a period of three months each year. These teams

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Tab I
Annex A

distribute seeds to farmers, medicines to the sick and information materials to the public at large. USIS plans to strengthen NDB and use it as one of the agencies for reaching Thai target groups. Chinese groups will be reached through other indigenous agencies, such as Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

D. USIS will meticulously avoid conveying the impression either to Government officials or to the public at large, that the primary responsibility for mounting the proposed psychological offensive rests on the shoulders of the United States. On the contrary, we must create the feeling that we are working with and supporting the Thai Government and the Thai people in their all-out effort to preserve this country's independence in the face of the current Communist threat. In short, both sides, from the very outset, should consider our relations as an active partnership for the purpose of preserving the independence and cultural integrity of this country.

E. The USIS program will be closely coordinated with, reinforce, and in turn be reinforced by, the United States political, economic and military programs in Thailand.

F. The following specific objectives will serve as a guide in determining program themes and content:

1. To convince the Thai people that the Communists consider Thailand a rich prize and that without counter-effort on their part they will fall under the ruthless yoke of Red China imperialism.
2. To make clear to the people that Communism threatens the things they cherish most dearly: their beloved King, the Buddhist Church, their ancient tradition of independence, individual ownership of land and material possessions, freedom to choose their own way of life.
3. To expose the methods and techniques used by the Communists in the conquest of other countries--their deceit and trickery in pretending to be for "the people" at the outset but eventually imposing a complete and ruthless foreign domination (with special reference to China, Korea, and Indochina).

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Approved For Release 2004/06/24 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100030001-6
Tab I
Annex A

distribute seeds to farmers, medicines to the sick and information materials to the public at large. USIS plans to strengthen NDB and use it as one of the agencies for reaching Thai target groups. Chinese groups will be reached through other indigenous agencies, such as Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

D. USIS will meticulously avoid conveying the impression either to Government officials or to the public at large, that the primary responsibility for mounting the proposed psychological offensive rests on the shoulders of the United States. On the contrary, we must create the feeling that we are working with and supporting the Thai Government and the Thai people in their all-out effort to preserve this country's independence in the face of the current Communist threat. In short, both sides, from the very outset, should consider our relations as an active partnership for the purpose of preserving the independence and cultural integrity of this country.

E. The USIS program will be closely coordinated with, reinforce, and in turn be reinforced by, the United States political, economic and military programs in Thailand.

F. The following specific objectives will serve as a guide in determining program themes and content:

1. To convince the Thai people that the Communists consider Thailand a rich prize and that without counter-effort on their part they will fall under the ruthless yoke of Red China imperialism.
2. To make clear to the people that Communism threatens the things they cherish most dearly: their beloved King, the Buddhist Church, their ancient tradition of independence, individual ownership of land and material possessions, freedom to choose their own way of life.
3. To expose the methods and techniques used by the Communists in the conquest of other countries--their deceit and trickery in pretending to be for "the people" at the outset but eventually imposing a complete and ruthless foreign domination (with special reference to China, Korea, and Indochina).

4. To destroy any belief that may exist in the invincibility of the enemy.

5. To build up a sense of pride in and loyalty toward their native land--its unique position in SEA, its historic freedom from foreign rule, its rich natural resources, its distinguished role among the Free Nations of the world, its armed forces and the important contribution they have made in defending the freedom of Korea.

6. To convince the Thai people that the U.S. is determined to assist them, to the extent of its resources, to resist the threat of Communist aggression (coordinate with JUSMAG program).

7. To establish confidence in the ability and determination of the U.S. and the Free World to stop Communism in its tracks whenever and wherever it attempts further aggression. (Coordinate with JUSMAG and UN programs.)

8. To impress upon the leaders and educated classes of Thailand the value and importance of the economic and military programs being conducted for the benefit of their country by the United States. (Coordinate with STEM and JUSMAG.)

9. To demonstrate to the low-income groups our interest in improving the health and welfare of the Thai people. (Coordinate with STEM program.)

10. To convince the Chinese and other minority groups that their future welfare and advancement depend on a stable, independent Thailand; that while their present situation has limitations and handicaps, they are far better off than they would be under the Communist yoke.

11. To assist the Embassy and other US agencies in the task of persuading Thai government leaders of the necessity for adopting policies toward Chinese in Thailand which would hasten their voluntary assimilation into the Thai nation.

G. Propaganda cannot operate effectively in a vacuum, guided by general moral convictions. As a basis for realistic planning and effective tactical operations, USIS will prepare a factual estimate of the situation. This will furnish essential information on such matters as the following: strength and location of the enemy, plans of the enemy and methods and materials he is currently using, most vulnerable target groups,

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Tab I
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attitudes, interests and aspirations of the typical member of each target group and most effective channels, media and themes for reaching and influencing each such group.

H. In light of the foregoing data, specific tactical operations will be planned and carried out through indigenous agencies with materials designed to exert maximum effect on specific target groups.

I. Most program materials (films, publications, radio programs, etc.) will be planned and produced either locally or at RPC Manila. Maximum use will be made of indigenous advisers to ensure most effective program materials. Continuous assessment of program results will be used to progressively increase program effectiveness.

J. To arouse, develop, guide and assist provincial leaders and agencies in a nation-wide resistance offensive and to serve as distribution points for its own materials, USIS will open and operate five provincial centers, one in the North, two in the Northeast, one in the Central Area and one in the Southern peninsula. Each center will be manned by an American and operate two or more sub-centers (manned by local personnel) and at least two mobile units to reach the more sparsely populated areas. Every effort will be made to establish several active psychological resistance units in each provincial area.

K. The program will be conducted with sufficient flexibility to meet new and unexpected developments as revealed by intelligence sources. The headquarters staff will be organized and will operate in a way to ensure maximum mobility of USIS manpower. Plans will be prepared and kept current for the immediate expansion of production facilities to meet emergency needs.

III. Operations:

Operations will be conducted on three broad fronts--government, low income populace and special target groups. Each one is to be approached initially with separate types of material and with distribution methods appropriate to its particular characteristics.

Operations ultimately will be carried on simultaneously on all three fronts, recognizing that to obtain the cooperation of the low-level groups it is necessary to have support and assistance of the government while at the same time, full government support cannot be expected without developing favorable public opinion on the part of the low-income groups which comprise such a large percentage of the total population.

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In the same way, development of special materials for special target audiences should aid in successful operations on the other two fronts and should be more effective as the result of attitudes created within the government and the low-level groups. These fronts will be approached as follows:

A. Government Front.

1. This will be the first new operation of USIS Bangkok and will involve the thorough indoctrination of all government officers and employees. The object will be to (1) convince the government of the seriousness of the Communist threat and (2) enlist the government's wholehearted support and active assistance in operations on the other two fronts.

2. Specific target groups will be (1) government officials, employees, teachers and members of the armed forces in Bangkok and (2) government officials, employees, teachers and members of the armed forces in the provinces.

3. Media to be used will include speakers and discussion leaders, pamphlets, posters, films and visual aids (charts, diagrams, etc., for the use of speakers).

4. The plan of action will be prepared by the USIS staff and submitted to the Prime Minister's committee for approval.

5. Program materials will be produced with the guidance of Thai advisers.

6. The program will be carried out by Thai leaders and cadres trained and guided by USIS.

7. A photographic record will be kept of the various program activities and every effort will be made to assess the impact of program materials and methods on the attitudes toward Communism of each target group.

B. The Low-Income Front.

1. Operations will be expanded as rapidly as feasible to include low-income groups (farmers, laborers and industrial workers) in critical areas such as the Northeast. Here the problem will be the immunization of such groups to ensure their resistance to the germs of Communism if and when they first appear.

2. Maximum use will be made of NDB field teams, district Nai Amphurs, and village headmen to reach the low-level audience in provincial areas.

3. Material interpreting U.S. policies will be distributed through independent mechanisms to be developed by USIS.

C. Special Targets Front

1. As soon as the estimate of the situation has been completed, and other high-priority target groups identified (such as segments of the Chinese population, Buddhist priests and newspaper men), operations will be still further expanded to provide specific programs to exert maximum effect upon the membership of such groups.

2. Preliminary attitude surveys will be made of these groups to determine most effective themes and media to utilize in each case and as a basis for assessing program results.

3. NDB and other indigenous agencies will be used to the extent possible in reaching these specific groups, in addition to the present direct methods, such as the Wireless Bulletin, radio programs, publication distribution, film distribution, and exchange of persons.

IV. Tactical Plan for Operation G-1*

A. Objectives

1. To convince the personnel of the Thai Government of the seriousness of the Communist threat to their country, their Government, their religion, and their way of life.

2. To enlist their wholehearted support and active assistance in carrying out the psychological offensive at the lower governmental levels and among the people outside the Government.

B. Target Groups

1. The officers and employees of the 13 Thai Ministries located in Bangkok: Agriculture, Communications, Cooperative

*G-1: First operation involving Government personnel in Bangkok.
(G-2: Will be second operation involving Government personnel in provinces.)

Affairs, Culture, Defense, Economic Affairs, Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Industry, Public Health, Justice, and Interior.

2. The officers and employees in the Lord Mayor's municipal staff.

C. The Program

1. An outstanding leader in each Ministry will be appointed by the Minister.

2. These 13 top leaders will be given an intensive indoctrination in Communism as a world-wide revolutionary movement inspired and controlled by Moscow. This indoctrination will be carried out by a top-flight training officer from the U.S. It will be based on authentic evidence taken from original Communist sources.

3. The 13 leaders will then return to their respective Ministries and present to all officers and employees the substance of the indoctrination lectures (USIS will supply charts and other visual aids to make these talks as effective as possible). The purpose of these lectures will be to lay a solid foundation in fact, so that subsequent talks and program materials, designed to stress the more localized threat, will be given the serious consideration they warrant and not be skeptically derided as fanciful propagandas.

4. The leaders will next arrange for four additional speakers who will deal specifically with the Communist threat to Thailand, as follows:

A Police Officer, who will give the inside CID story as it relates to current Communist efforts to infiltrate and subvert the Thai people.

A Viet Minh Renegade, who will describe his disillusionment with the Communists and how much better the Thai way of life is; also, the current Viet Minh threat to Thailand's northern borders.

A Buddhist Priest, who will describe the Communist threat to their religion, their priests, and their holy ways. (Using Ho Chi Minh's statement that Buddhism is an enemy of the people.)

A Thai Army Officer who has served in Korea, who will describe the Communists intentions to conquer the free countries, one by one, and with arms, if necessary; the atrocities in Korea as a coldly calculated part of the Communist pattern of action; the eagerness of North Koreans to escape the Communists and return to freedom when given the opportunity during the prisoner exchange.

5. During the foregoing lecture period, the leaders will form one or more permanent cadres in each Ministry to organize discussion groups, arrange for subsequent speakers, distribute anti-Communist materials, and show anti-Communist films. (USIS will help train the cadres and supply printed materials and films.)

6. Exhibit boards, with poster and picture materials, will be placed in all Government office buildings at strategic locations. (USIS will service these boards.)

7. The lecture course in each Ministry will open with a recorded message from the King. The National flag and the King's picture will be displayed in each meeting place.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE FOR THAILAND

Intelligence required to assist in the formulation and execution of a psychological program

(The number and letters in the parentheses are keyed to the "Psychological Offensive for Thailand", Annex A to Tab I)

STAGE I - STRATEGY

SELECTION

Why pick this country?

- A. Is Thailand in danger of communist attack by force?
- B. Are the communists attempting or likely to attempt to subvert Thailand?
- C. Do the Thai* have will and capacity to resist attack by force or subversion?
- D. Can Thai will and capacity be increased?
- E. How does Thailand compare in above respects with major alternative targets?
- F. Are Thailand people providing an example and leadership to other peoples and governments of the area?

STAGE II - PLANNING

OBJECTIVES

What do we wish to accomplish?

- (11) A. What is the potential of the Thai to develop greater will and capacity to resist communist infiltration, subversion, and political pressure?
 - 1. What factors in Thailand contribute to such will and capacity?
 - (F5) a. What is the content of the nationalist idea in Thailand?
 - (1) Do Thais profess a superiority in culture, skill, history?

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- (2) How do they regard other countries and foreigners, especially China and the Soviet?
- (3) Are they nationally proud, and of what?
- (F2) b. Do the Thai cherish deeply certain elements of national life?
 - (1) Would these include King, independence, property, and way of life?
 - (2) Others?
- (F8) c. Are the Thai working towards goals of economic and social development?
 - (1) How much have they done and planned on their own?
 - (2) Do cultural factors affect Thai attitudes towards development?
 - (F9) (3) How strongly do the masses desire improvement of material conditions?
- 2. What factors tend to weaken Thai will and capacity to resist communism?
 - (F10) a. Are there minorities with insecurities and unsatisfied aspirations?
 - (1) Do the external connections of some minorities contribute to their dissidence -- e.g., Vietnamese, Chinese?
 - (F11) (2) Is Thai official policy unable to handle minority problems?
 - b. Are these aspects of Thai culture and society that diminish will and capacity?
- 3. Do the Thai understand the threat of communism?
 - (F1) a. Do they think the communists regard Thailand as a rich prize?
 - (F2) b. Do they think the communists threaten their cherished ideals and ways? (See 1b above).

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- (F3) c. Do they see through the communist claim to be "for the people" ?
- (1) What understanding have they of China, Korea, Indochina ?
- (F4) d. Do they think of communism as invincible ?
- e. What do they think of the Thai Autonomous State ?
- f. Is their view of communism distorted by other claims and connotations, e.g., that communism favors rapid growth of national power, or economic development ?
4. What are the attitudes of Thai towards the U.S. ?
- (F6) a. Do the Thai think the U.S. will determinedly support them ?
- (1) Is there any impediment in fear of imperialism ?
- (2) Do they consider U.S. has both power and will ?
- (3) How do they regard U.S. culture, "materialism," manners ?
- (F7) b. What confidence do they have in U.S. and Western will and capacity to stop communist aggression ?
- (1) What view do they have of U.S. leadership and Free World cohesion ?
- (2) What do they think about collective security organization for S.E. Asia ?
- (F8-9) c. Do the Thai respect the U.S. tradition of material improvement ?
- d. Do major segments of Thai society differ in respect of the above attitudes ?
5. What aspects or activities of communism will affect the Thai ?
- (F1) a. Do the communists regard Thailand as a rich prize ?
- (1) Have they said so ?

- (2) Does this conclusion flow from their general policy?
- (3) Have they said the contrary?
- (F2) b. What is communist attitude and practise toward Buddhism?
- (F3) c. What have been communist methods of suppressing "the people"?
- (F3) d. Has communism imposed itself in Asia as a "foreign" domination?
- (F4) e. In what ways has communism been shown to be defeatable?
- (F7) f. Have the communists shown intentions for further aggression?
- (12) B. What is the prospect for increasing Thai will and capacity to support the armed forces in case of attack?
- (F8) 1. What is the attitude of the Thai towards military action?
 - a. How do they regard the army?
 - b. Have they experience or tradition of national action?
 - (1) Practise in use of weapons?
 - (2) Guerrilla warfare?

STAGE III-PROGRAMMING APPROACH

What have we to work with?

- (G) A. What are the capabilities and intentions of the communists?
 - 1. What is communist strength in Thailand?
 - a. Size, distribution and influence of Party?
 - b. Character and indoctrination of leaders?

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2. How do communists go about their business?**a. Targets and degree of infiltration?****b. Command over communications?****c. Degree and character of external support?****(1) Quantity of broadcasting and content thereof?****(2) Personal and organizational connections?****3. What will the communists do next?****a. Indications of intended change or build-up of activity?****4. What target-groups might be most vulnerable to communists?****B. What aspects or activities of communism will affect the Thai?****(F1) a. Do the communists regard Thailand as a rich prize?****(1) Have they said so?****(2) Have they said the contrary?****(3) Does the conclusion flow from their general policy?****(F2) b. What is communist attitude and practise toward Buddhism?****(F3) c. What have been communist methods of suppressing "the people"?****(F3) d. Has communism imposed itself in Asia as a "foreign" domination?****(G) C. What elements in Thailand are susceptible to US influence?****1. What target groups are most influential in determining national action in Thailand?****a. Which groups at the present time?****b. Which groups may gain influence in the near future?****c. Are there groups which may "cause trouble"?****d. What groups influence mass opinion?**~~SECRET~~

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2. How susceptible are these groups severally to US influence?
- (G) D. What are the means available for communication in Thailand?
1. What are the formal media? (Radio, films, press, books, other printed materials)
 - a. Number, character and geographical distribution of units.
 - b. Target group distribution of each medium.
 - c. Reception -- literacy, radio receivers, movie houses.
 - d. Overlap in various media audiences.
 2. What are the informal channels of communication?
 - a. What persons are spreaders of information and opinion?
 - b. Organizational networks: government, religious, labor, social, etc.
 - c. Focuses of exchange: markets, festivals, etc.
 3. What are production facilities?
 - a. Presses.
 - b. Movie studios.
 - c. Radio.

**STAGE IV - OPERATING
ACTION**

What shall we do?

(III) A. What are strengths and weaknesses of communist influence in each of the (perhaps selected) infiltrated groups?

1. In respect of leaders?
 - a. Which leaders are relatively convinced and unapproachable?
 - b. Which leaders are susceptible, by reason of rivalry, weakness, skeletons in the closet?

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2. In respect of membership satisfaction?
 - a. What are communist policies in the group?
 - b. What elements do these policies satisfy?
 - c. What elements do these policies fail to satisfy?
 - d. What objectives might compete with communist policies?
3. In respect of competing groups?
 - a. What groups do or might compete with the communist outfits for the same clientele?

B. What are the susceptibilities of selected other target groups?

1. In respect of leaders?
 - a. In what ways do individual leaders appear susceptible to influence?
2. In respect of membership?
 - a. What does the group desire?
 - b. How does it go about, or propose, to get there?
3. In respect of orientation?
 - a. How does the group see itself in the national or social picture?
 - b. How much and how does the group appreciate even wider issues? (Communism, East-West, colonialism.)

(B) 4. In respect of group thinking?

- a. What are the stereotypes current?
 - b. What ideals do they intend to serve?
5. In respect of communications?
 - a. Are there formal media?
 - b. Who is in control of production facilities and how susceptible to influence?

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- c. How are group opinions formed and influenced?
- d. What "rituals" shape and crystallize group thinking?
- e. What kinds of information do the members expect to receive through each formal or informal medium?
- f. What are the sources of the information relayed through these media?

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Tab I, Annex C

List of Intelligence Products Relating to Thailand

January 1952 through May, 1954
with selected items 1950-1951

(These products were prepared by OIR/State and the
Office of the Coordinator for Psychological Intelligence)

NOTE: Each project is listed only once under its primary description though it may, in addition, meet specific requirements under other categories.

I. A. Segments of Society

- 1) The status of organized labor in Southeast Asia: Thailand. April 3, 1950. Restricted. (OIR-5181.3)
- 2) Education in Thailand. March 9, 1950. Restricted. (DRF-IP-314).
- 3) Political opportunities for Chinese Communists in Thailand. August 21, 1950. Secret. (OIR-5151)
- 4) Totalitarian aspects of political parties in Indochina, British Malaysia, and Thailand. October 23, 1950. Confidential. (DRF-212)
- 5) Data on ethnic groups for use in psychological warfare: Thailand. March 7, 1951. Restricted. (Contribution to CS5.12)
- 6) Overseas Chinese as a propaganda target group: Thailand. August 7, 1951. Confidential. (Contribution to P-area study)
- 7) Labor organization in Thailand. August 29, 1951. Secret. (DRF-DR-241)
- 8) Buddhist institutions in Thailand and their intelligence aspect. August 20, 1952. Secret. (IR-5625.9S-IX)
- 9) Impact of the presence of US personnel in certain Far Eastern countries: Thailand. November 28, 1952. Confidential. (Contribution to S/P paper)
- 10) Non-Communist political opposition in Thailand. April 30, 1953. Secret. (IR-6253)

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- 11) The position of Overseas Chinese communities in the various countries of Southeast Asia: Thailand. February 19, 1954. Confidential. (DRF-SP-39)
- 12) U. S. Problems among Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: Thailand. September 29, 1953.
- 13) Southeast Asian receptivity to higher moral and religious content in the international information program. May 7, 1953.
- 14) The problem of education of Overseas Chinese. January 4, 1954. Secret (IR-6506)

B. Communications Media

- 1) Notes on cultural and political factors relevant to problems of visual propaganda media in Thailand. August 21, 1950. (Memorandum)
- 2) Analysis of the press in Thailand. September 1, 1950. Confidential. (OIR-5340)
- 3) Newspapers which might be quoted by FBIS. May 18, 1951. Restricted. (Contribution to IP-423)
- 4) Data on newspapers and periodicals in Thailand. July 31, 1952. Confidential. (CPI request)

C. Foreign Propaganda

1. Facilities

- 1) Government of Thailand not enforcing restrictions on Communist propaganda. (IB-1135)
- 2) Thai Government continues to tolerate local Communist-front activity. September 23, 1952. Confidential. (IB-1232)
- 3) Communist propaganda activities in Thailand. October 14, 1952. Secret. (Memorandum to IIA)

2. Content

- 1) Communists charge US assistance to Chinese Nationalist troops in Southeast Asia. January 11, 1952. Secret. (IB-1086)

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- 2) Thai Communists move to identify Party with major popular issues. October 24, 1952. Confidential. (IB-1000.500)
- 3) Reaction papers: Thailand. 1952, 1953, 1954.
- 4) Communist and Anti-Communist propaganda in Southeast Asia: Thailand during 1953. May 11, 1954. (CPI-SP33)
- 5) Political Complexion of Chinese Language Newspapers in Southeast Asia. November 28, 1952.
- 6) Chinese Communist propaganda concerning Thailand. May 20, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6308)

D. Public Opinion

- 1) See particularly items under Current Intelligence below-- II. C. 1. a.
- 2) Developments significant for propaganda: Thailand. Weekly, 1952, 1953, 1954. (IR-5550.xx)
- 3) CPI weekly briefings: Thailand. 1953.
- 4) Preliminary assessment of Asian attitudes toward the Indochinese Conflict. December 7, 1953. (CPI-SP 24)

E. Descriptive Details

(This type of information is frequently furnished to USIA through telephonic contacts rather in formal reports.)

- 1) Official holidays, 1950: Thailand. January 1951. (Memorandum)
- 2) Major holidays celebrated in Southeast Asia: Thailand. May 30, 1951. (CS5.-23)

F. World Communism

- 1) Developments in world Communism: Thailand. 1952, 1953, 1954. Secret. (Contributions to IR-5650)
- 2) Southeast Asian Communists at Social Welfare Conferences: Thailand. October 13, 1952. Confidential. (DRF contribution to CPI paper)

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F. World Communism (continued)

- 3) Indications of Communist activity in Thailand.
December 9, 1952. Secret (IB-1297)
- 4) Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the
Communist Party, Thailand. February 1953. Secret.
(IR-6165.6)
- 5) Assessment of Communist strength in Southeast Asia.
January 29, 1954.

II. Intelligence for More General Purposes

A. Estimates

- 1) Communist capabilities and intentions in Asia.
April 1, 1952. Secret. (DRF contribution and NIE 47)
- 2) Consequences of a Korean truce: Thailand. April 1953.
Secret. (DRF contribution and IE-52)
- 3) Thailand's ability to withstand communist pressures
or attacks. May 24, 1953. Secret. (DRF contribution
and SE-45.)
- 4) Communist courses of action in Asia through mid-1955:
Thailand. September 24, 1953. Secret. (DRF contri-
bution and NIE-98)
- 5) Present and prospective capabilities of non-communist
Asia: Thailand. October 1, 1953. Secret. (DRF-SP-21)
- 6) Thai reaction to Viet Minh victory in Indochina.
November 30, 1953. Secret (DRF-SP-30)
- 7) Probable Thai policy following loss of Indochina to
communist control. April 15, 1954. Secret. (DRF-SP-43)
- 8) The foreign economic impact of a US business decline.
May 10, 1954. For Official Use Only. (DRF contribu-
tion and IE-65)

B. Basic Intelligence

1) National Intelligence Survey: Thailand

a) Political

Section 50 -- Introduction

- 51 -- The Constitutional System**
- 52 -- Structure of the Government**
- 53 -- Political Dynamics**
- 54 -- Public Order and Safety**
- 55 -- National Policies**
- 57 -- Subversive**
- 58 -- Propaganda**
- 59 -- Biographies of Key Personalities**

b) Economic

Section 60 -- Introduction

- 64 -- Manufacturing and Construction**
- 65 -- Trade and Finance**
- 61 -- Agriculture and Food (nearly complete)**
- 62 -- Fuels and Power (nearly complete)**
- 63 -- Minerals and Metals (nearly complete)**

c) Sociological

Section 40 -- Introduction

- 41 -- Population**
- 42 -- Characteristics of the People**
- 43 -- Religion, Education, and Public Information**
- 44 -- Manpower**
- 46 -- Public Welfare**

2) Reports

a) Political

(1) The Viet Minh Invasion of Laos and the Threat to Thailand: a background report. May 15, 1953. Secret. (IR-6311)

(2) The Thai Autonomous Region in Yunnan (Sibsong Panna). July 3, 1953. Secret (IR-6318)

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b) Economic

- (1) Institutional Impediments to Private US Investments in Southeast Asia: Thailand. March 6, 1952. Restricted. (IR-5819)
- (2) Factors affecting climate for US investment in mineral development abroad: Thailand. May 14, 1952. Confidential. (Contribution to IR-5905.3)
- (3) Asian rice prospects for 1961: Thailand. August 1952. Restricted. (IR-5940)
- (4) Government expenditures on economic and social services in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. April 15, 1953. Restricted. (IR-6152)
- (5) Economic conditions and short-term economic prospects in Japan and Southeast Asia: Thailand. July 16, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6345)
- (6) Contemplated expenditures by the Thai Government on economic developments projects. August 12, 1953. Restricted. (Memorandum)
- (7) Foreign Trade Developments in South and Southeast Asia, 1950-52. August 25, 1953. Unclassified. (Contribution to IR-6349)
- (8) Bilateral agreements in international trade. April 22, 1954. Unclassified. (Contribution to IR-6110R1)

C. Current Intelligence

1) Reports

a) Political

- (1) The new constitution and political prospects in Thailand. March 13, 1952. Secret. (IB-1121)
- (2) Mounting political tension in Thailand. September 4, 1952. Secret. (IR-6006)

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- (3) The government of Thailand may be moving toward neutralism. September 4, 1952. Confidential (IB-1000.487)
- (4) Thai government arrests opposition elements. November 20, 1952. Confidential. (IB-1279)
- (5) Prospects of Thai-Cambodian-Laotian alliance. January 19, 1954. Confidential. (IB-1548)
- (6) Chinese irregular forces in Burma. February 15, 1954. Secret. (IR-6507)

b. Economic

- (1) Possible effects of lower sterling rates in Thailand. April 10, 1952. Confidential. (IR-5861)
- (2) British-Thai rice negotiations. October 29, 1952. Confidential. (IR-6050)
- (3) Deterioration in Thailand's trade and balance of payments position in 1952 and 1953 prospects. July 14, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6241)
- (4) Thailand's trade prospects for 1953 continue to deteriorate. October 9, 1953. Confidential. (IR-6445)

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Tab J

Case Study on India

1. Because of the presence in Washington of the Deputy PAO from New Delhi, Mr. William Handley, the Survey Team sought to obtain as much insight as possible into the field needs in India and capabilities and points of view with regard to intelligence.

2. On the basis of discussions with Mr. Handley, other USIA personnel, and intelligence officers, the following conclusions were reached:

a. That a bibliographical statement of the existing intelligence production relevant to the types of intelligence needed by USIA should be sent to the field for the selection of those items which would be of greatest likely use.

b. In the development of an operational plan for India, an intelligence annex should be developed, based upon the findings in the Thailand case study and adapted to meet the peculiar needs of India. The terms of reference for such an annex are attached at Annex A hereto.

c. That there were possibilities for PAO reporting but that requirements for such reporting should be carefully drawn, levied in moderation, and fulfilled in full cooperation with the Embassy.

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TAB: J
Annex A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROGRAM FOR INDIA

Intelligence questions which should be considered and answered selectively to assist the formulation and execution of a psychological program.

(The four "Stages" represent a time-sequence; the questions thus frequently overlap, but need to be answered with increasing detail as the operation progresses from the problem of deciding upon the country target--Stage 1 - to the problem of deciding upon the group or individual target--Stage 3 - and the selection of themes and actions--Stage 4.)

STAGE 1 - STRATEGY

SELECTION

Why pick this country?

- A. Is India in danger of communist attack by force?
- B. Are the communists attempting or likely to attempt to subvert India?
- C. Does India have will and capacity to resist attack by force or subversion?
- D. Can India will and capacity be increased?
- E. What attitudes does India display towards the Cold War?
- F. In what direction are these attitudes likely to develop?
- G. Are there means whereby these attitudes can be changed favorably to the West?
- H. Does India provide an example and leadership to other peoples and governments?

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- I. How does India compare in above respects with major alternative targets?

SECTION II - PLANNING

OBJECTIVES

What do we wish to accomplish?

- A. What are the attitudes of the government and people of India towards the East-West conflict?

1. How do they view present global East-West Tension?

- a. Do they see it resulting from a conflict of principle, a desire for power, aggressive tendencies, fear of aggression, or from other forces?
- b. What possible developments of the situation do they fear and what do they think the actual course of developments is likely to be?
- c. Where do they think their own interests lie in the situation?

2. Do Indians understand the threat of communism?

- a. Do Indians think the communists intend to take over their country?
- b. What confidence have the Indians that they can resist communism?
- c. Do Indians think that communism threatens their ideals, aspirations and way of life?
- d. To what extent do Indians see through communist professions, such as being "for the people," and communist misrepresentations of the West?

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- e. Is the Indian view of communism distorted by expectations that it might be potentially beneficial to them, as offering speedy solutions for social and economic problems and enabling India to develop into a strong and powerful nation?
 - f. Do they think, or tend to think, of communism as the wave of the future, or invincible?
 - g. What knowledge and understanding have Indians of communist history, with special regard to the treatment of satellites?
3. What do the Indians think of the West?
- a. How do Indians assess Western objectives, intentions and capabilities towards the Communist bloc countries?
 - b. What do Indians think of collective security measures involving association with the West?
 - c. Does concern over political and economic imperialism color Indians' attitudes toward the West?
4. What do they think of the US?
- a. What identities and differences of interest do they see between themselves and the US?
 - b. What view do they have of US leadership in the Free World?
 - c. How do they react to US foreign policy generally?
 - d. Do they admire or condemn particular aspects of US culture as they see it? e.g., liberty, "materialism."
 - e. What other factors contribute to the present state of Indo-US relations?
5. What other attitudes condition their view of the East-West tension?
- a. Do differences and disputes with other nations of the area affect the Indian attitude toward the US and the West? (e.g., the Kashmir and canal waters disputes with Pakistan.)

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Annex A

- b. What influence do ideological, moral or religious concepts have on the Indian attitude toward the East-West conflict?
- B. What factors contribute to shape, strengthen, or weaken these attitudes?
 - 1. What is the content of the nationalist idea and sentiment in India?
 - a. How strong is the Indian sense of national unity? What factors tend to promote or hinder the growth of Indian national consciousness?
 - b. Have Indians a pride in their nation, its history and achievements? To which features of these do they point with pride?
 - c. How do Indians look upon themselves and their culture in comparison with the people and cultures of other countries?
 - d. How do Indians regard other countries and their nationals, especially the USSR and China, Europe and the US?
 - e. Do Indians cherish deeply certain elements of their national life?
 - (1) Would these include democracy, independence, religion, property and way of life?
 - (2) Others?
 - f. Are the Indians working towards goals of economic and social development?
 - (1) How much have they done and planned on their own?
 - (2) Do cultural factors affect Indian attitudes towards development?
 - (3) How strongly do the masses desire improvement of material conditions?

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Annex A

- g. Have the Indians a vigorous tradition of political consciousness and activity?
 - (1) Is the government apparatus now or potentially capable of controlling communist pressure?
 - (2) What circumstances do or might arouse in the Indian people intense feeling on political questions?
- h. Are there minority problems?
 - (1) Do the minorities suffer from insecurities and unsatisfied aspirations?
 - (2) How does the majority look upon the minorities?
 - (3) What are official policies towards minorities?
 - (4) Is the government capable of applying these policies or of obtaining satisfactory solutions?
- i. Are there other aspects of Indian culture and society which influence Indian attitudes towards the East-West conflict?
- C. Do Significant segments of Indian society hold views and attitudes which differ from those discussed above?
- D. Do any particular factors affect Indian attitudes towards using of force to resist aggression?
 - 1. How do they regard the army and military service?
 - 2. Have they experience or tradition of military action?
 - a. Practise in use of weapons?
 - b. Guerrilla warfare?
 - 3. Are there cultural, ideological, or religious factors which condition Indian combativeness or martial spirit?

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Tab J
Annex B

List of Intelligence Products Relating to India

January 1952 through May 1954,
with selected items 1950-1951

(These products were prepared by OIR/State and the Office
of the Coordinator for Psychological Intelligence)

NOTE: Each project is listed only once under its primary description, though it may, in addition, meet specific requirements under other categories.

I. A. Segments of Society

- 1) Data on Ethnic Groups: India. September 14, 1951. Restricted. (Contribution to CS-5.12).
- 2) Major Religions of India. December 11, 1951. Restricted. (IR 5668).
- 3) Some Aspects of Religion in India. October 31, 1951. Confidential. (IR 5684).
- 4) Labor Organizations in India. January 3, 1952. Confidential. (IR 5525).
- 5) Organization and Influence of Buddhist Institutions in the World Today: India. January 23, 1952. Secret. Contribution to IR 5625.3).
- 6) Developments in the Asian Socialist Movement. September 10, 1952. Confidential. (Contribution to IR 5731).
- 7) Minority Problems in the Near East and South Asia. October 21, 1952. Confidential (SP 243).
- 8) Data on Organized Labor in India. October 24, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 245).

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- 9) Distribution of Occupation of India's Gainfully Employed December 9, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 257)
- 10) Nehru's Attitudes Toward Communism, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. July 24, 1953. Secret. (IR 6269).
- 11) Background Information on Panchatantra 12/53.
- 12) Material Supporting USIA Activities in India in Dealing with Issue of U. S. Military Aid To India 1/54.
- 13) Analysis of Nehru Statements On Communism 12/53.
- 14) U. S. Doctors In India 12/53.
- 15) Activities of US Missionaries in India 2/54.
- 16) Indian Attitudes Towards the US 11/53.
- 17) Background Information on French Enclaves In India 4/54.
- 18) Forthcoming Election In Trvancore-Cochin 11/53.
- 19) Background Data On South Asia 11/53.
- 20) Estimates of the Reactions Of Indians To the Failure of the U. S. to Ratify the Geneva Convention and of U. S. Leaders to Condemn the Use of BW. 7/52.
- 21) Estimated Reactions to Increased UN Bombing Activity in Korea 8/52.
- 22) Extent of Resentment In India Toward Living Standards of Americans in India 4/52.
- 23) Linguistic Self Determination In India 12/52.
- 24) Recently Constituted State Governments In India 4/52.
- 25) Comparison of Indian and U. S. Voting Behavior 1/52.
- 26) Bibliography of Basic PW materials and documents 2/53.
- 27) Anti-westernism In India 5/51.

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- 28) Indian Attitudes Toward India's Current International Role 9/53.
- 29) Moral and Religious Content In the IIA Program: India 5/53.
- 30) Indian Misconceptions of the U.S. 5/53.
- 31) Survey of Foreign Including Indian Attitudes Toward U.S. Economic Policies 8/51.

B. Communications Media

- 1) Channels of Public Information in India. March 17, 1952. Confidential. (IR 5551).
- 2) Circulation of Indian Newspapers 2/54.
- 3) Chinese Radio Broadcasts to South Asia 2/54.
- 4) Background Information On Times of India 12/53.
- 5) Possible Improvement of U. S. Collection Efforts On the Communist "Book Program" in South Asia 2/54.
- 6) Background Information On the All India Radio 1/54.
- 7) List of Publications Sponsored By Communist Press in New Delhi 1/53.
- 8) Information On the Bombay Free Press Journal 4/52.

C. Foreign Propaganda

1. Program Content and Plans

- 1) Soviet and Chinese Economic and Cultural Moves in India, January 1947-July 1952. July 26, 1952. Confidential. (Contribution to IR 5972).
- 2) The Nature of Communist Social Welfare Propaganda in India. November 1952. Restricted. (Memorandum).
- 3) Communist Make Large-Scale Effort to Involve India Intellectuals and Culture in "Peace Campaign." March 17, 1952. Restricted. (IB 1123).

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- 4) Communist Books in India and Pakistan. January 22, 1952. Restricted. (SP 180).
- 5) Quotations Indicating the Importance Communist Attached to India. February 21, 1952. Unclassified (SP 193).
- 6) Quotation from the "Program of the Communist International." June 27, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 222).
- 7) Communist Penetration of Indian Motion Pictures Industry and Indian Music. October 7, 1952. Confidential. (SP 238).
- 8) Extent to Which Communist-Line Press in India Plays Up the Issue of Racial Discrimination in the US. March 15, 1954. Secret. (Memorandum).
- 9) Information On Western Commercial Advertising and Communist Controlled or Communist Front Newspapers 3/53.
- 10) Effects of the BW Campaign In India 11/52.
- 11) Soviet Cultural Activities In and Exchange of Visitors With India 8/51.
- 12) Communist Propaganda In India. 6/51.

D. Public Opinion

- 1) See items under Current Intelligence below-II. C.1.a
- 2) Developments Significant for Propaganda: India. Weekly, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954. (IR 5550.xx).
- 3) Reports on reactions to bacteriological warfare campaign, Eisenhower election, President's atomic energy proposal, Geneva Conference, etc.
- 4) South Asian Attitudes Toward the West. June 27, 1951. Restricted. (OIR 5372).
- 5) Indian Newspaper Comments on Treatment of Negroes in the US. November 24, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 253).
- 6) Indian Press Comments on Secretary Dulles, May 13, 1953. Unclassified. (Memorandum).

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- 7) Indian Reactions to Dulles-Eisenhower Foreign Policy Statement 12/53.
- 8) Intelligence To Support Advertising Campaign In India. 12/53.
- 9) Indian Comment on Forthcoming Berlin Conference 1/54.
- 10) Analysis of Christian Science Monitor Article on Communism in India 1/54.
- 11) Analysis of IBS Memo on Communism in India 1/54.
- 12) Pro-US Statements made by Indian and Pakistani Leaders 12/53.
- 13) Indian Reactions to Secretary Dulles' Speech of March 29, 1954.
- 14) Indian Reactions to H-Bomb Tests and Related Developments 4/54.
- 15) Conference of South Asian Prime Ministers in Ceylon 4/54.
- 16) Indian Opinion on the Geneva Conference 4/54.
- 17) Indian Reaction to Nehru's Statement Refusing to Permit Overflight of India 4/54.
- 18) Indian Reactions to US Atrocity Charges in the UN 11/53.
- 19) Indian Reactions to Developments in Iran 11/53.
- 20) Foreign Opinion Concerning American Comics 5/54.
- 21) Reactions to the Moscow Economic Conference and of the Returning Delegates 4/52.
- 22) Reactions to the Japanese Peace Treaty 4/52.
- 23) Indian Reactions to Ambassador Dean's Efforts at Panmunjon 10/53.
- 24) Foreign Opinion on the Geneva Conference (Serial) 4/54.
- 25) Indian Opinion on the Soviet Peace Tactic and on President Eisenhower's April 16 Speech 4/53.

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- 26) World Opinion on Soviet Possession of the H-Bomb 9/53.
- 27) World Press Reactions to the Seventh G.A.: India 10/52.
- 28) Miscellaneous other reactions reports to Stalin Death, Eisenhower Victory, Korean Armistice Negotiations, etc.
- 29) Foreign Reaction to the Question of Grain Shipments from the US to India.

E. Descriptive Details

(This type of information is usually furnished to USIA by telephone, rather than in formal reports.)

- 1) Holidays Celebrated in Countries of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. January 24, 1951. Unclassified (DRN-IP 258)
- 2) American Support for Indian Independence. November 17, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 251).

F. World Communism

- 1) The Extent of Communist Penetration in India. March 8, 1951 Secret. (OIR 5373)
- 2) Developments in World Communism: India. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954. Secret (Contributions to 5650).
- 3) Analysis of Communist Propaganda: India. May 30, 1952. Secret. (IR5714.1).
- 4) The World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations. 1953, 1954. Unclassified. (Contribution to IR 4489).
- 5) Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the Communist Party, India. January 1953. Secret (IR 6165.11).
- 6) Indian Communist Activities Since the Elections. In progress. Secret. (IR 6399).
- 7) Material on Soviet Intentions in India 2/54.
- 8) Communist Effort in India in 1953.

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- 9) Recent Communist Propaganda in India 11/52.
- 10) Information on Calcutta Communist Conference 2/52.
- 11) Evaluation and Analysis of New Delhi Document "Communist Party: Facts and Fiction" 4/53.
- 12) Information on Communist Activity in India 10/52.

II. Intelligence For More General Purposes

A. Estimates

- 1) Trade With the Soviet Bloc--South Asia. March 31, 1952. Secret. (Contribution to NIE 59).
- 2) Consequences of Communist Control Over the Indian subcontinent. April 30, 1952. Secret. (Contribution to NIE 61).
- 3) Probable Developments in South Asia. March 6, 1953. Secret. (NIE 79).
- 4) Foreign Economic Conditions and Trends. September 24, 1953. Restricted. (Contribution to IE-53).
- 5) Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through Mid-1955. October 14, 1953. Secret. (Contribution to NIE-98).
- 6) Soviet Bloc Capabilities for Economic Warfare. October 1, 1953. Secret (Contribution to NIE-100)
- 7) The Vulnerability of Non-Communist East Asian Countries to Communist Pressure, 1953-55. November 16, 1953. Secret (Contribution to IR 6465).

B. Basic Intelligence

- 1) National Intelligence Survey: India
 - a) Political

Section 50 -- Introduction (almost completed)
51 -- The Constitutional System

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Annex B

Section 52 -- Structure of the Government
53 -- Political Dynamics
54 -- Public Order and Safety
55 -- National Policies
57 -- Subversive
58 -- Propaganda
59 -- Biographies of Key Personalities

b) Economic

Section 60 -- Introduction
61 -- Agriculture and Food
62 -- Fuels and Power
63 -- Minerals and Metals
64 -- Manufacturing and Construction
65 -- Trade and Finance

c) Sociological

Section 40 -- Introduction
41 -- Population
42 -- Characteristics of the People
43 -- Religion, Education and Public Information
44 -- Manpower
46 -- Public Welfare

2) Reports

a) Political

- (1) India's Position in the East-West Conflict.
May 24, 1951. Secret (OIR 5526).
- (2) India's First General Elections and Their Results.
June 19, 1952. Confidential. (IR 5852).
- (3) Problems of Refugee Rehabilitation and Plebiscite
in the States of Jammu and Kashmir. December
23, 1952. Restricted. (IR 5780).
- (4) The Indo-Pakistan Canal Water Rights Dispute.
June 30, 1953. Secret. (IR 5649).

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- (5) Factors Affecting Political Stability in India.
Secret. In progress. (IR 5782.4).
- (6) The Linguistic States Problem in India. In progress.
Confidential. (IR 6596).

b. Economic

- (1) The Food Problem of India. September 25, 1950.
Confidential. (OIR 5262).
- (2) Major Development Projects in South Asia: India. October 12, 1950. Confidential. OIR 5350.
- (3) The Agrarian Problem of India. February 19, 1951.
Restricted. (OIR 5354).
- (4) India: Geographic, Social, Political and Economic Conditions.
October 31, 1950. Restricted. (OIR 5371).
- (5) Land Reform in India. November 10, 1950. Confidential.
(OIR 5390).
- (6) South Asian Trade Relations with the Soviet Bloc and China.
June 11, 1951. Secret. (OIR 5458).
- (7) Availability of Strategic and Essential Commodities in South Asia. August 7, 1951. Secret. (OIR 5527).
- (8) Political and Economic Factors in Foreign Countries Affecting the Development of Their Raw Materials for Export. June 12, 1951. Confidential. (Contribution to OIR 5553).
- (9) Economic Conditions in Kashmir. November 9, 1951.
Restricted. (IR 5622).
- (10) Current Status of India's Food Supply. December 14, 1951.
Restricted. (IR 5669).
- (11) South Asia Data Book. 1952 (IR 5623), 1953 (IR 6310).
- (12) Opportunities for Private Investment in TCA Countries as Indicated by IBRD and Ex-dm Bank Mission Reports. November 1952. (Contribution to IR 6087).

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(13) Partition Debt of Pakistan to India. March 12, 1932.
Unclassified. (SP 198).

(14) Grant and Loan Assistance Given to India by US and
International Agencies, July 1947-June 1952.
July 24, 1952. Unclassified. (SP 225).

c) Sociological

(1) Cows and Monkeys in India. March 26, 1952.
Restricted. (SP 200).

(2) Birth Control in India: Prospects for Alleviating the
Problem of Over-Population. January 20, 1954.
Confidential. (IR 6268).

C. Current Intelligence

1) Reports

a) Political

(1) Deviationism in the Communist Party of India.
January 17, 1950. Secret (OIR 5143).

(2) Suggestions of Bad Feeling Between the Chinese
Communist and Indian Communist Parties. March
31, 1950. Secret (OIR 5221).

(3) Soviet Intervention in Kashmir Dispute.
January 31, 1952. Secret. (IR 5781).

(4) Results of the Indian Elections. March 24, 1952.
Unclassified. (IR 5853).

(5) Congress Party Government Ousted in One Indian
State, Possibly Threatened in Two Others. April
29, 1952. Restricted. (IB 1152).

(6) Indo-Pakistan Relations Worsened by Political Upset
in Kashmir. August 13, 1953. Secret. (IB 1473).

(7) Nehru-Ali Communique on Kashmir Indicates Little
Progress. August 25, 1953. Secret. (IB 1480)

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Tab J-6
Annex B

- (8) Communist Fail to Win Control of Andhra, India's Newest State. October 6, 1953. Confidential. (IB 1498).
- (9) The Forthcoming General Election in Travancore-Cochin. November 23, 1953. Secret (SP 308).
- (10) Analysis of Christian Science Monitor Article by Gordon Graham on Communism in India. January 20, 1954. Confidential. (SP 312).
- (11) Indian Communists Face Test of Strength in Travancore-Cochin Elections. February 19, 1954. Secret (IB 1559)
- (12) Kashmir Constituent Assembly Ratifies the States Accession to India. February 26, 1954. Secret. (IB 1564).
- (13) Nehru Presses for Control of French Enclaves in India. April 14, 1954. Secret. (IB 1596).
- (14) Colombo Conference: Five Asian Nations Offer Advice to Powers at Geneva. May 12, 1954. Secret. (IB 1616).

b. Economic

- (1) Possible Utilization of Certain Indian Resources for Far Eastern Development. February 6, 1952. Confidential. (IR 5725).
- (2) New Indian-Pakistani Trade Agreement May Restore Normal Trade. April 8, 1953. Confidential (IB 1383).
- (3) The Problem of Land Reform in India. January 1952. Confidential. (SP 172).
- (4) Foreign Economic Conditions and Trends in Africa. Near East, and South Asia. July 1, 1953. Restricted. (Contribution to SP 290).

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LIST OF RESEARCH PROJECTS GATHERED IN INDIA RELATING
TO USIA's PROGRAM FOR INDIA

(These Projects were conducted under the guidance of the
former Evaluation unit in USIA)

1. Selected Segments of Societies

a. Size, Composition, Ideologies & Attitudes toward US, USSR, etc.

IEV.IND.26 Questions Raised by Indians about American Women,
12/17/52
IEV.IND.27 Some Clarification of the word, "Americana",
12/19/52
IEV.IND.28 Survey of USIS Local Staff Opinion, 12/23/52
IEV.IND.31 Results of Bombay Press Survey Conducted by
Asian Press Service, 8/30/51
IEV.IND.33 Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material
by English-Language Press - July 1951, 9/29/51
IEV.IND.36 Opinion Poll Among USIS Local Staff in India 9/53
IEV.IND.47-1 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I -
Channels of Communications, 5/54
IEV.IND.47-2 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
IEV.IND.47-3 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
Communications and the Background of Opinion
in the Village, 5/54
** USIS Indian Staff Opinion Study - A Quarterly
Mail Survey

b. Patterns of Influence among Groups

IEV.IND.9 USIS Output and the Industrial Worker Audience,
5/5/53
IEV.IND.47-1 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I -
Channels of Communications, 5/54

** Not yet received.

- IEV.IND.47-2 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
 Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
 Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
- IEV.IND.47-3 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
 Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
 Communications and the Background of Opinion
 in the Village, 5/54
- **..... Study of Operation of USIA Outpost Hyderabad

2. Media Research and Analysis

a. Types of Media in the Country

- IEV.IND.3 Pilot Study (Prepared for Guidance in Formulating
 a Content Analysis of Certain Foreign
 Newspapers with a View to Assessing the
 Efficacy of the USIS Program) 5/16/52
- IEV.IND.29 Theme Analysis of the Anti-American Line
 Demonstrated in Two Books in India, 1/12/53
- IEV.IND.45 The Image of America and Americans as Presented
 in the Communist-Line Press in India: An
 Analysis of Crossroads and Blitz, 1/20/54
- IEV.IND.47-1 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
 Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I -
 Channels of Communications, 5/54
- IEV.IND.47-2 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
 Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II,
 Public Opinion in Lucknow, 5/54
- IEV.IND.47-3 Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of
 Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III,
 Communications and the Background of Opinion
 in the Village, 5/54
- IEV.IND.48 The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis of
 the Indian Press, 2/9/54

b. Organizational Aspects of Each Medium

- IEV.IND.5 Evaluation of Some Operating Problems in the
 Placement of Expendable Libraries, 3/16/53
- IEV.IND.7 An Administrative Study of the U.S. Educational
 Foundation in New Delhi, 4/27/53

** Not yet received.

IEV.IND.38 Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program in
India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53
IEV.IND.48 The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis
of the Indian Press, 2/9/54
IEV.IND.49 Evaluation Study: Miniature Library Study,
2/12/54

d. Content of the Communications Output by the Media

IEV.IND.3 Pilot Study (Prepared for Guidance in Formulating
a Content Analysis of Certain Foreign News-
papers with a View to Assessing the Efficacy
of the USIS Program), 5/16/52
IEV.IND.8 Report on the Administration of Pictures for the
Film Attitude Survey, 5/21/53
IEV.IND.10 Public Attitudes Toward the Community Projects
Program: Kothipur, Naglapathak Village
Study, 10/7/52
IEV.IND.11 The Image of America and Other Foreign Countries
as Presented in Textbooks, 7/53
IEV.IND.22 Fulbright Students in India 1951-1952, 10/8/52
IEV.IND.30 Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material
by English-Language Press, June 1951, 8/9/51
IEV.IND.33 Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material by
English-Language Press, July 1951, 9/29/51
IEV.IND.42 Report on the Evaluation of the Quality and
Effectiveness of the Translations of the
USIS India, 12/53
IEV.IND.44 Information Analysis for New Delhi - An Analysis
of Content: Middle East Bulletin Input...
New Delhi Post Output, 5/15/53
IEV.IND.45 The Image of America and Americans as Presented
in the Communist-Line Press in India: An
Analysis of Crossroads and Blitz, 1/20/54
IEV.IND.48 The Imagery of America: A Content Analysis of
the Indian Press, 2/9/54
IEV.P.11 Analysis of Wireless Bulletin Input and Post
Output for New Delhi, Athens, Mexico, Hong
Kong, 5/1/53

e. Location and Type of Audience Receiving Media Output

IEV.IND.13	A Readership Study of the English Language Edition of the <u>American Reporter</u> , 9/10/52
IEV.IND.14	A Readership Study of the Hindi Edition of the <u>American Reporter</u> , 9/18/52
IEV.IND.15	A Readership Study of the Tamil Edition of the <u>American Reporter</u> , 10/15/52
IEV.IND.16	A Readership Study of the Malayalam Edition of the <u>American Reporter</u> , 10/28/52
IEV.IND.17	A Readership Study of the <u>American Reporter</u> Telugu Edition, 11/3/52
IEV.IND.18	A Readership Study of the Bengali, Gujarati and Marathi Edition of the <u>American Reporter</u> , 10/24/52
IEV.IND.21	Library Study, 1/13/53
IEV.IND.24	Effectiveness of the USIS Auditorium, Calcutta, 2/4/53
IEV.IND.37	The Voice of America Audience in India as Measured by those Who Received the VOA Newsletter, 8/53
IEV.IND.38	Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program in India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53
IEV.IND.39	Study of the Placements of Miniature Libraries Throughout India, 1/13/53
IEV.IND.47-1	Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part I, Channels of Communications, 4/54
IEV.IND.47-2	Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part II, Public Opinion in Lucknow, 4/54
IEV.IND.47-3	Communication of Ideas in India - A Survey of Lucknow and Three Indian Villages - Part III, Communications and the Background of Opinion in the Village, 4/54
**.....	Analysis & Elimination of Duplication in USIA Distribution List

f. Audience Reactions to Media and Why

IEV.IND.1	Some Preferences of Indian Radio Listeners, 2/53
IEV.IND.2	Fan Mail Received by the <u>American Reporter</u> in India, 1/52

**Not yet received.

IEV.IND.5 Evaluation of Some Operating Problems in the
Placement of Expendable Libraries, 3/16/53

IEV.IND.7 An Administrative Study of the U.S. Educational
Foundation in New Delhi, 4/27/53

IEV.IND.10 Public Attitudes Towards the Community Projects
Program: Kothipur, Naglapathak Village
Studies, 10/7/52

IEV.IND.12 The American Reporter - Staff Paper, 3/27/52

IEV.IND.13 A Readership Study of the English Language
Edition of the American Reporter, 9/10/52

IEV.IND.14 A Readership Study of the Hindi Edition of the
American Reporter, 9/18/52

IEV.IND.15 A Readership Study of the Tamil Edition of the
American Reporter, 10/15/52

IEV.IND.16 A Readership Study of the Malayalam Edition of
the American Reporter, 10/28/52

IEV.IND.17 A Readership Study of the American Reporter
Telugu Edition, 11/3/52

IEV.IND.18 A Readership Study of the Bengali, Gujarati and
Marathi Editions of the American Reporter,
11/24/52

IEV.IND.19 American Reporter: Survey of Mail from Readers
12/28/51

IEV.IND.20 Evaluation of Exhibits in India, 11/7/52

IEV.IND.21 Library Study, 1/13/53

IEV.IND.22 Fulbright Students in India 1951-1952, 10/8/52

IEV.IND.23 Film Evaluation Report, 1/30/53

IEV.IND.24 Effectiveness of the USIS Auditorium, Calcutta,
2/4/53

IEV.IND.25 Delhi Public Opinion Study, 10/22/52

IEV.IND.28 Survey of USIS Local Staff Opinion, 12/23/52

IEV.IND.31 Results of Bombay Press Survey Conducted by
Asian Press Service, 8/30/51

IEV.IND.33 Qualitative Analysis of Usage of USIS Material by
English-Language Press, July 1951, 9/29/51

IEV.IND.35 New Delhi Film Evaluation Study, 8/4/53

IEV.IND.38 Study of VOA Reception of the Hindi Program in
India as Relayed from Ceylon Radio, 7/53

IEV.IND.40 USIA New Delhi, Incoming Mail Analysis Chart,
8/18/53

IEV.IND.41 Opinion Poll Among USIS Local Staff in India,
9/24/53

IEV.IND.42 Report on the Evaluation of the Quality and
Effectiveness of the Translations of the USIS
in India, 12/53

IEV.IND.43 A Study of Exchange of Persons, 12/53
IEV.IND.44 Information Analysis for New Delhi - An Analysis
of Content: Middle East Bulletin input...New
Delhi post output, 4/15/53
IEV.IND.46 An Analysis of the Incoming Mail Received at the
Delhi Post Addressed to the "Question and
Answer" Column of American Reporter, 2/5/54
IEV.IND.49 Evaluation Study: Miniature Library Study, 2/12/54
IEV.P.11 Analysis of Wireless Bulletin Input and Post
Output, 4/1/53
**..... Survey of School and University Preference for
Maps
**..... Mail Survey of Labor Audience Reading Taste of
a Sample of Readers of "The American Labor
Review"
**..... VOA Audience Taste Study with Program Analyzer

**Not yet received.

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V

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
SUPPORT FOR NATO STANDING GROUP

1. The attached paper is submitted for consideration by the IAC in response to the needs of the NATO Standing Group Intelligence Committee, and SHAPE for strategic intelligence support as expressed by the U. S. Member, NATO Standing Group Intelligence Committee, and by G-2, which serves as the executive agent to provide intelligence support for SHAPE

2. It is the view of the representatives of the IAC agencies that the handling of specific requests for U. S. national strategic intelligence assistance to NATO will be greatly facilitated if there can be a common understanding of the nature of this problem and a procedural framework agreed upon as set forth in the recommendations.

3. There is also placed on the agenda a current request for a National Intelligence Estimate to go to the Standing Group Intelligence Committee, the recommendation for which is based on this paper (see IAC-D-39/2).

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
SUPPORT FOR NATO STANDING GROUP

PROBLEM

1. To determine a practicable means for providing U. S. support to meet the needs of the NATO Standing Group and its major commands for national strategic intelligence estimates. (This excludes strictly military intelligence estimates.)

RECOMMENDATION

2. It is recommended that National Strategic Intelligence support shall be provided for NATO as follows:

a. For the Standing Group (it being understood that the initiative rests with the U. S. Member, Standing Group Intelligence Committee).

(1) Specific NIE or SE on authorization of the DCI with the concurrence of the IAC for the U. S. Member to show to the other members [] of the Intelligence Committee, with U. S. Member retaining custody of the document.

(2) Specific NIE or SE on authorization of the DCI with concurrence of the IAC for U. S. Member to table in the Intelligence Committee ("table" means to use in Committee as background in the production of NATO strategic estimates);

(3) Preparation of estimates to meet explicit NATO needs for tabling in Intelligence Committee, it being understood that it is Standing Group practice to disseminate for comment to the U. S., [] national staffs those national contributions which have been prepared in response to a specific request;

b. For the major command concerned (it being understood that the initiative rests with the major commands through JIC to IAC):

(1) Preparation of specific estimates to meet the explicit needs of the major command concerned, such estimates to be tabled in the major command for use of international officers only.

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DISCUSSION

3. It should be noted that in no case would a National Intelligence Estimate or Special Estimate be permitted to go to a foreign national staff. The document produced by the Intelligence Committee even though it were identical with the U. S. National Estimate would be transmitted to the major commands or to the foreign national staffs without any formal identification of origin or connection with the United States Government other than U. S. concurrence in any NATO estimate.

4. Under present arrangements SHAPE is authorized to request contributions on area intelligence from the National Staffs. Insofar as such requests deal strictly with military intelligence, the support is provided by the JIC or by the competent Service agency. In other cases the support required may take on the character of a National Intelligence Estimate. It is understood that upon transmittal of the latter category of intelligence by JIC to SHAPE, SHAPE would presumably, with its own staff, produce its own intelligence estimate out of the national contributions. OK

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TAB A

NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT FOR NATO STANDING GROUP

BACKGROUND

1. The NATO Standing Group is a military body composed of high level representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Subordinate to this Group is an Intelligence Committee whose functions are:

To provide strategic intelligence estimates to the Standing Group for its use and reference, as necessary, to the regional commands of NATO in pursuit of the NATO mission.

2. U. S. participation in the Intelligence Committee is through the U. S. Member who has close relations with JIC, JIG and the Service intelligence agencies and who relies immediately upon them for assistance. JIC is executive agent of the Defense Department and acts for the U. S. Government in providing the military intelligence and is the channel for providing national strategic intelligence support required for NATO Standing Group for military purposes.

3. The U. S. Government has supported the development and establishment of NATO because of its estimate that in the face of Soviet policy it is only by combining their resources that the Western nations can frustrate Soviet designs and at the same time maintain a free society. Action by the 12 members of NATO in gearing themselves economically, militarily, and morally to the tasks at hand is dependent upon a common appreciation of the facts concerning the Soviet and its preparations for war, its capabilities, and its intentions.

4. The U. S. Government, while geographically most remote from the Soviet orbit, has been most concerned about the Soviet problem. As the single nation with the material and moral resources necessary, the U. S. has found it necessary to take the leadership in virtually all fields of the common effort. This leadership can be strengthened and made more effective if it is fully extended to the intelligence sphere as well. One of the main problems the U. S. has had with respect to NATO has been to convince them that the Soviet menace is not so vast as to make Western resistance pointless. Joint strategic intelligence and guidance can be of immeasurable value in the resolution of these problems.

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5. Furthermore the U. S. is the only country with sufficiently comprehensive and reliable intelligence resources to provide a reasonably accurate appraisal of Soviet strength, capabilities and intentions.

DISCUSSION

6. The U. S. must support NATO with strategic intelligence for two reasons:

a. To discharge our obligation to provide to the Standing Group the best strategic intelligence and guidance available to support and direct the combined military strategic planning and secondarily to make known to the major NATO commands the strategic intelligence upon which strategic planning is based; and

b. To assist the NATO nations to properly and accurately assess the Soviet menace.

7. The United States Government is currently making available to the U. S. Member, Standing Group, Intelligence Committee, through JIG appropriate intelligence of all the agencies and of the IAC. It is also making available to SHAPE for tabling:

- a. sanitized summaries of Watch Committee reports;
- b. military intelligence;
- c. a political-economic summary prepared by the Department of State's intelligence area;
- d. certain portions of the National Intelligence Surveys.

Specifically with respect to national strategic intelligence estimates, support for NATO has been confined to the following:

- a. making NIE's and SE's available to the U. S. Member for his background in dealing with the other members of the Intelligence Committee;
- b. assisting in the preparation of an initial overall estimate for the Standing Group;
- c. the preparation of SE-16 in response to a specific request of the U. S. Member, Standing Group, Intelligence Committee.

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8. Underlying our decision regarding the substance of our strategic intelligence support of NATO and the method to be used for providing it are these major considerations:

a. Need for cooperation: It is clear that NATO cannot meet the crisis which it faces if its members are mutually suspicious that each is holding back from the other his true purposes or his true estimate of the situation. A genuinely cooperative attitude is an essential if the personal relationships of members of the Standing Group, the Intelligence Committee, and the major NATO commands are to generate harmony which is required for joint action. This problem has been faced in practically all our participation in international organizations.

b. Need for U. S. leadership: Because of the limited resources of most of the NATO governments to produce intelligence information and high quality national estimates, U. S. intelligence has the large share of producing strategic intelligence. As the chief contributor to NATO intelligence, the U. S. must be scrupulous in its effort to contribute to the common cause the maximum which other considerations will permit. Because it has greater resources for collection, collation, and estimating than any other of the NATO powers its obligation to assume leadership in this respect is undeniable.

c. Appropriateness of U. S. strategic intelligence to NATO needs: National Intelligence Estimates as currently prepared by the IAC are designed to meet the needs of the President and U. S. policy officials. Frequently the way these estimates are written is stimulated by, and therefore directed toward, the requirements of U. S. policy. This may be to respond to an existing situation, to take the initiative with respect to a developing situation, or to create a situation to our advantage in our relations with the enemy, our allies, or the neutrals. Such intelligence estimates might well be inappropriate, from the U. S. point of view, for meeting NATO needs (although they might influence the other nations to our advantage) unless they were carefully selected and their use was surrounded with adequate restrictions. Strategic intelligence for NATO should be pointed toward the strategic questions facing NATO although in some cases these may coincide with the immediate questions facing the United States Government. To obtain maximum U. S. strategic intelligence support for NATO with the least expenditure of our limited personnel and resources requires us to use if at all possible what we have already

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produced, taking into account: (a) the danger of divulging prematurely a U. S. policy move; (b) the security consideration.

d. Security: In any dissemination of U. S. intelligence to foreign governments in addition to the obvious hazard of tipping the U. S. policy hand prematurely to our allies there is the more serious danger of malicious or unintentional leak to the USSR. The foreign national members of the Standing Group, the Intelligence Committee and the major NATO commands have an international character and are either morally bound or sworn not to divulge to their national staffs intelligence or other information having to do strictly with the international or collective business of NATO. On the other hand it is understandable and entirely probable that in retaining their relationships to their national staffs (highly necessary to maintain and develop vitality and viability of the international groups) there will be some unauthorized revelation of information. It is difficult to provide assurances comparable to that effected within this Government that no such leaks either malicious or unintentional will occur because: (1) these foreign nationals with international responsibility have not been subjected to security investigation equal to our own, and (2) they possess a dual role as international and national officials. Any arrangement, therefore, for the transmission of U. S. national strategic intelligence must either be based on faith that no disclosure will occur or upon recognition that some disclosure is inevitable and that, special estimates will have to be prepared for NATO or existing ones will have to be expurgated. It is noteworthy that this problem is more acute for the United States than for other countries because of its larger potential contribution to the common fund of intelligence and because, on account of the U. S. power position, the USSR would consider a U. S. intelligence estimate of much more value to them than one representing the views of any other country.

TAB

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IAC-D-40/1
4 February 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Attached is the redraft of IAC-D-40 pursuant to the action of the IAC at its meeting of 31 January 1952 and including an additional proposal of the FBI (last phrase of Paragraph 3). It would be appreciated if a written concurrence to this proposed NSC letter would be sent to my office by Thursday, 7 February 1952.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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4 February 1952

REDRAFT

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Security Information
IAC-D-40/1
4 February 1952

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Dissemination of National Intelligence
to Foreign Governments

1. In keeping with the present policy of the United States which associates this country with other governments in political and military cooperation, it is essential to provide these governments with U. S. national intelligence where such action will contribute to the security of the United States.

2. Heretofore national intelligence has been given some foreign dissemination, on a highly selective basis, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] to a few other foreign governments and NATO bodies.

This has been done under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence as inferred from the National Security Act of 1947 and the National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The volume of intelligence that can and should be released to certain foreign governments has become so considerable, however, that the National Security Council is requested to grant some specific authorization and clearly fix the responsibility for the dissemination of national intelligence to foreign governments.

3. It is therefore proposed that paragraph 5 of NSCID-1 be designated 5(a) and that the following be inserted:

Paragraph 5(b) - Unless otherwise provided by law or NSC Directive, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to

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disseminate National Intelligence on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and international bodies upon determination by the Director of Central Intelligence, concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, that such action would substantially promote the security of the United States provided that any disclosure of classified military information included in such national intelligence is in accordance with the policies laid down in the U. S. National Disclosure Policy (MIC 206/29), such determination to be made by the Army, Navy and Air Force; and provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information will be cleared with that Agency prior to dissemination.

4. In connection with the general subject of dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments, it is noted for the information of the National Security Council that the Central Intelligence Agency has been in the past and is currently disseminating intelligence information collected by it and finished intelligence (other than national intelligence) produced by it to certain foreign governments on a reciprocal basis. This is being done in keeping with national security interests and, where military information is involved, under the President's policy with respect to dissemination of military information to foreign governments (MIC 206/29). This has been necessary and extremely useful in securing the product of the intelligence

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agencies of the foreign governments to add to our own intelligence resources.

5. This proposal has been approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

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TAB

IAC-D-45/2
(Revised)
23 June 1953

DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Procedure for release of national intelligence documents to foreign governments in pursuance of NSCID 1, revised, will be as follows:

National Intelligence Estimates

1. In forwarding the draft of an estimate to the IAC, ONE will propose its release or non-release to foreign governments, giving reasons therefor, and indicating in cases where release is proposed what governments should receive the estimate.

2. An agency nonconcurring in this proposal will specify, at the IAC meeting next after the meeting at which the estimate is discussed, its reasons for nonconcurrence. When there is objection to proposed release, specific reference will be made to any paragraphs considered non-releasable. The IAC will then agree either to release, not to release, or to release a sanitized version.

Other Types of National Intelligence

3. Proposals for the dissemination to foreign governments of other types of national intelligence will be submitted to the Secretary of the IAC, who will bring it to the attention of the IAC.

Notification of Dissemination

4. The agency serving as executive agent for the dissemination of a particular category of national intelligence will notify the Secretary of the IAC when the authorized dissemination has been made and this will be reported in the IAC minutes for the information of all concerned.

IAC-D-45/2
(Revised)
23 June 1953

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IAC-D-45/2
(Revised)
23 June 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

1. Attached is a revision of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the former procedure for securing IAC concurrence on dissemination of national intelligence to foreign governments.

2. This revision was adopted at the IAC meeting on 23 June 1953.

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[Redacted Signature Box]

Secretary

IAC-D-45/2
(Revised)
23 June 1953


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IAC-D-77/1
28 December 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

BUDGETARY ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Attached (TAB A) for the information of the IAC is a copy of the DCI's letter to the Bureau of the Budget on this subject. The letter incorporated suggestions made at the IAC meeting of 15 December (IAC-M-133, paragraph 3) and transmitted suggested categories (TAB B) as they were amended at that meeting and subsequently discussed with Mr. Macy.


Secretary

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IAC-D-77/1
28 December 1953

TAB A to
IAC-D-77/1
28 December 1953

COPY

23 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Macy
Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT: Budgetary Analysis of Intelligence Programs

1. In response to your 17 November 1953 request for advice and assistance from the Intelligence Advisory Committee in the development of a more adequate budgetary analysis of U.S. intelligence programs and more specifically in the formulation of a categorized approach to budgetary analysis, there is attached a suggested initial listing of categories to accomplish these purposes.

2. In keeping with the understanding reached at the IAC meeting at which you were present, internal security programs are excluded from the categories as they will be excluded from the analysis.

3. Based on informal consultation, it is my understanding that you believe these categories will be suitable to assist you, at least in the initial stages, to achieve the objectives outlined by you on 17 November to the IAC.

4. As the survey proceeds, the Bureau should feel free to call upon the IAC for additional assistance, as appropriate. It would be appreciated if the Bureau's findings would be made available to the IAC.

/s/ Robert Amory, Jr.
for
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

TAB A to
IAC-D-77/1
28 December 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B to
IAC-D-77/1

28 December 1953

Suggested Categories for the Survey of Intelligence Budgets

1. The major categories should be restricted to the classical classification of intelligence, namely: collection, production and dissemination.

2. The category "collection" should be divided as overt and covert.

3. Intelligence activities under the category "production" should be further classified as follows:

- a. Political, cultural and sociological
- b. Ground Forces
- c. Naval Forces
- d. Air Forces
- e. Economic
- f. Scientific and Technical

4. No attempt has been made to classify "production" or the subdivisions of "production" as basic, current and national intelligence. Such a division, if made, would be unrealistic, inasmuch as in some agencies the employment of personnel on these respective categories of intelligence will vary with the intensity of international relations and crises. There is no formula thus far discovered or used among the agencies which could indicate the actual allocation of total resources to those categories of intelligence.

5. The category "dissemination," for the sake of uniformity in the survey, should include screening, reproduction, translation, distribution and libraries, although the relationship of those functions to both production and collection is recognized.

6. In connection with these activities, whether by intelligence or by operations, which serve purposes other than intelligence, the approximate intelligence cost should be broken out and listed. This is particularly applicable to certain problems in collection, but is not necessarily restricted to collection.

TAB B to
IAC-D-77/1

28 December 1953